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"HARE AND HOUNDS": THE FUGITIVE
DEFENDANT'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE
PURSUED
United States v. Diacolios*
Bruce A. Green**
A true fugitive, whose location is unknown, or who is successfully re-
sisting government efforts to bring him into the jurisdiction, will not
be able to obtain dismissal of an indictment. This is as it should be.
Otherwise, the courts would be sanctioning the playing of games by
fugitives.1
[W]henever an individual has been officially accused of a crime,
not only is the government charged with the burden of bringing the
accused swiftly to trial, but it is under an obligation to exercise due
diligence in attempting to locate and apprehend the accused, even if
he is a fugitive who is fleeing prosecution 2
INTRODUCTION
A criminal defendant has a constitutional right to a speedy
trial. But what about a defendant who attempts to thwart the
possibility of a speedy trial-or, indeed, of any trial-by con-
cealing himself or fleeing the jurisdiction? If he is later appre-
hended, may the fugitive defendant complain that he was denied
a speedy trial because the prosecution did not try diligently
enough to catch him?
In early 1988, the Second Circuit said yes. It recognized a
* 837 F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 1988) Before Altimari, Kearse, and Lasker, JJ.; opinion per
Altimari. The author of this Article, while not participating in the Diacolios case in the
district court, participated in preparing the government's brief on appeal and argued the
case on behalf of the government in the Second Circuit.
** Associate Professor, Fordham University School of Law. I am grateful for the
tireless research assistance provided by Alyssa Aiello, Fordham University class of 1991,
as a fellow of the Stein Institute on Law and Ethics. In addition, I am grateful to Profes-
sors Marc Arkin, Dan Capra and Jim Kainen for their helpful comments on earlier drafts
of this Article.
' United States v. Salzmann, 548 F.2d 395, 404 (2d Cir. 1976) (Feinberg, J., concur-
ring) (footnote omitted).
2 Raybom v. Scully, 858 F.2d 84, 90 (2d Cir. 1988).
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new constitutional "right" in criminal cases: the right of a fugi-
tive defendant to be pursued diligently by the prosecution. The
court did not recognize this right by name; instead, it announced
a correlative prosecutorial duty "to exercise due diligence in at-
tempting to locate and apprehend" a fugitive defendant.3 Ac-
cording to the court in United States v. Diacolios,4 this duty
arose out of the sixth amendment right to a speedy trial. The
Diacolios court intended that the government's duty of "due dil-
igence" be legally enforceable; if the government did not make
an adequate effort to find and apprehend a fugitive defendant,
his indictment could be dismissed on the ground that pretrial
delay amounted to a violation of the speedy trial clause.
This Article begins by tracing the creation of the fugitive
defendant's right to be pursued. The Diacolios panel's establish-
ment of this right represented a substantial extension of the Su-
preme Court decisions interpreting the speedy trial clause.
Those decisions are described in Part I, which focuses particu-
larly on cases in which the Supreme Court has determined the
circumstances under which the prosecution has a responsibility
to expedite a criminal trial. Most importantly, this section ex-
amines a case relied on by the Second Circuit in Diacolios,G
Smith v. Hooey,6 which established the prosecution's duty to try
to secure the presence of an indicted defendant who is impris-
oned in another jurisdiction.
The Diacolios panel also departed sharply from the long-
established principle that a fugitive defendant waives the right
to a speedy trial and therefore has no remedy for pretrial delay
which occurred during his flight. Part II describes the cases and
statutes which reflect that principle. Although recent statutes
and case law appear to have partially retreated from the tradi-
tional approach, only the Diacolios decision has explicitly deter-
mined that the prosecution has a legally enforceable obligation
to pursue all fugitive defendants.
Although lacking a firm foundation in the decisions of the
Supreme Court and courts outside the circuit, Diacolios was, in
3Id.
" 837 F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 1988).
Diacolios, 837 F.2d at 82.
6 393 U.S. 374 (1969).
1 Id. at 383 (state "had a constitutional duty to make a diligent, good-faith effort"
to bring defendant, who was incarcerated elsewhere, before the court for trial).
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some senses, the logical culmination of prior Second Circuit case
law. The question resolved in Diacolios had first arisen in the
Second Circuit more than a decade earlier, when, in the after-
math of the Vietnam War, an innovative district judge initiated
a review of cases pending against fugitive defendants who were
charged with evading the military draft." Part III discusses the
Second Circuit's speedy trial decisions with regard to fugitive
defendants prior to 1988, and in particular, it examines United
States v. Salzmann.9 In that case, the Second Circuit found that
the prosecution had failed, as required by the court's then-ex-
isting speedy trial rules, to exercise "due diligence" to obtain an
absent defendant's presence at trial on draft evasion charges."0
Salzmann formed part of the basis for both the district court
and circuit court opinions in Diacolios.
Part IV describes and analyzes the Diacolios decisions
themselves. Among other things, it notes the failure of both the
district court and the court of appeals to recognize, or at least,
to acknowledge, the novelty of the proposition that they es-
poused. This, along with the brevity of the Second Circuit's
opinion-a scant five pages-may explain why Diacolios has
passed almost unnoticed by commentators as well as by courts
outside the Second Circuit-even at a time when it is such an
exceptional occurrence for a federal court decision to expand the
constitutional rights of criminal defendants.
Part V considers the question that the Diacolios panel
failed to ask itself: whether there is a legal basis for establishing
what, in essence, is a constitutional right of fugitive defendants
to be pursued. In particular, this section explores whether con-
temporary Supreme Court decisions applying the speedy trial
clause warrant a departure from long-established legal doctrines
which recognize that a fugitive may not complain of pretrial de-
lay caused by his deliberate evasion of the court's process. It
concludes that the rationale-and constitutional underpin-
nings-of the traditional view have not been eroded by the con-
temporary decisions.
8 See United States v. Salzmann, 417 F. Supp. 1139 (E.D.N.Y.) (Weinstein, J.),
aff'd, 548 F.2d 395 (2d Cir. 1976); United States v. Lockwood, 382 F. Supp. 1111
(E.D.N.Y. 1974) (Weinstein, J.).
9 548 F.2d 395 (2d Cir. 1976).
1o Id. at 403 (Government "did not exercise the due diligence required by our rules
to obtain the presence of the defendant.").
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As described in Part VI, the Diacolios opinion did not go
unnoticed by the criminal defense bar. Later in 1988, relying on
Diacolios, three other criminal defendants argued that the pros-
ecution had failed to pursue them with sufficient vigor while
they were evading prosecution.1 These cases forced other Sec-
ond Circuit panels to confront Diacolios, and these subsequent
panels brought with them an air of skepticism toward the new-
found prosecutorial "obligation to exercise due diligence" in pur-
suing fugitive defendants. While reaffirming the existence of this
obligation-as they were constrained to do-the later panels
rendered this obligation virtually meaningless. They did so by
interpreting "due diligence" narrowly and, more important, by
minimizing the legal significance of the prosecution's failure to
meet its obligation of pursuit. Consequently, although fugitive
defendants indicted in the Second Circuit now have a constitu-
tional "right" to be pursued, few will succeed in securing the
dismissal of criminal charges because of a violation of this right.
Like many ethical rules, the prosecutorial duty of "due dili-
gence" is now largely unenforceable. The last part of this Article
considers whether there should be, if not a legally enforceable
obligation, at least an ethical obligation on the prosecution's
part to pursue fugitive defendants. This Article concludes that,
although justifications may be offered for such an ethical duty,
these justifications are not particularly compelling. The prosecu-
tion should have discretion to decide whether, and how exten-
sively, to pursue a fugitive defendant who is aware of the pend-
ing charges and fully able to appear in court.
I. THE SUPREME COURT'S VIEW OF THE SPEEDY TRIAL RIGHT
The sixth amendment promises that "[iun all criminal pros-
ecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy . . . trial
.. M12 The origins of this provision have been traced as far
back as the Assize of Clarendon (1166) and the Magna Carta
(1215).'" Although its historic purpose is to protect arrested de-
" Garcia Montalvo v. United States, 862 F.2d 425, 426 (2d Cir. 1988); United States
v. Blanco, 861 F.2d 773, 777-79 (2d Cir. 1988); Raybom v. Scully, 858 F.2d 84, 90 (2d Cir.
1988). See also United States v. Koskotas, 695 F. Supp. 96, 99 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
12 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
13 See Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 223-25 (1967) (describing the roots
of the speedy trial clause in English law). See also Petition of Provoo, 17 F.R.D. 183,
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fendants from languishing in jail for long periods of time while
awaiting trial,14 the sixth amendment's contemporary function
has been described more broadly by the Supreme Court:
[This constitutional guarantee has universally been thought essential
to protect at least three basic demands of criminal justice in the An-
glo-American legal system: "[1] to prevent undue and oppressive in-
carceration prior to trial, [2] to minimize anxiety and concern accom-
panying public accusation and [3] to limit the possibilities that long
delay will impair the ability of an accused to defend himself.""
The sixth amendment is only one among a variety of legal
guarantees which require that prosecutions proceed with dis-
patch. For example, statutes of limitations require an indict-
ment to be filed within a specific period of time after a crime has
been committed.16 This provides some protection against the
harms that may be caused by extensive preindictment delay, in-
cluding the impairment of the putative defendant's ability to
mount a defense as well as the anxiety that may flow from never
knowing whether criminal charges will someday be brought.1"
Of more recent vintage are rules and statutes that authorize
trial judges to dismiss the prosecution when the trial is unduly
delayed after the defendant has been arrested or formally
charged. For example, Rule 48(b) of the Federal Rules of Crimi-
nal Procedure, adopted in 1944, grants the district court discre-
tion to dismiss an indictment where "there is unnecessary delay
196-97 (D. Md.), afl'd, 350 U.S. 857 (1955) (per curiam) (examining historical roots of
the right to a speedy trial).
24The speedy trial clause was patterned on similar provisions adopted by the colo-
nies such as the Virginia Declaration of Rights of 1776, which provided, "in all capital or
criminal prosecutions a man hath a right.., to a speedy trial .... " Va. Declaration of
Rights § 8 (1776), quoted in Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 225 (1967). The
most relevant historical antecedent of these provisions was the English Habeas Corpus
Act, 1679, 31 Car., ch. 2, which required that imprisoned defendants be indicted within a
specific period of time and be brought to court within a specific period after a writ of
habeas corpus was issued.
15 See Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374, 377-78 (1969) (footnote omitted) (quoting
United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 120 (1966)).
" See generally W. LAFAvE & J. ISRAEL, CuUNAL PROCEnUR § 18.5(a), at 699-700
(1985).
See, e.g., Toussie v. United States, 397 U.S. 112, 114-15 (1970) (Statute3 of limita-
tions are "designed to protect individuals from having to defend themselves against
charges when the basic facts may have become obscured by the passage of time and to
minimize the danger of official punishment because of acts in the far-distant past.");
Howgate v. United States, 7 App. D.C. 217, 244 (1895).
1990]
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in bringing a defendant to trial . .. "18 In addition, the Speedy
Trial Act,'" which has largely supplanted Rule 48(b), requires a
trial to take place within 70 days of indictment, subject to vari-
ous permissible periods of delay.20 In recent years, the applica-
bility of these provisions has often made it unnecessary for a
court to invoke the sixth amendment speedy trial clause to pro-
tect an individual from having to defend against stale charges. 21
On the infrequent occasions that the Supreme Court has in-
terpreted the sixth amendment speedy trial right,22 it has held
that (1) the guarantee applies in both state and federal proceed-
ings;23 (2) the sixth amendment right addresses only those pre-
trial delays that occur after a defendant has been arrested or
charged with a crime;24 and (3) dismissal of an indictment is the
18 FED. R. CRIM. P. 48(b) provides, in pertinent part, that: "If there is unnecessary
delay in presenting the charge to a grand jury or. . . in bringing a defendant to trial, the
court may dismiss the indictment. . . ." This rule was said to be "a restatement of the
inherent power of the court to dismiss a case for want of prosecution." Notes of Advisory
Committee on Rules, Note to Rule 48(b) (citing Ex parte Altman, 34 F. Supp. 106 (S.D.
Cal. 1940)).
'9 18 U.S.C. § 3161 et seq. (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
2 See id. at § 3161(c)(1). See generally W. LAFAvE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 16, §
18.3(b), at 692-94.
" Courts will look to statutory provisions first because of the general preference for
avoiding constitutional questions and, more importantly, because the statutory provi-
sions are both more specific than the speedy trial clause and more protective of the de-
fendant's interest in obtaining a speedy trial.
22 See United States v. Loud Hawk, 474 U.S. 302 (1986); United States v. MacDon-
ald, 456 U.S. 1 (1982); Moore v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 25 (1973) (per curiam); Strunk v.
United States, 412 U.S. 434 (1973); Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972); United States
v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 313-22 (1971); Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S. 30 (1970); Smith v.
Hooey, 393 U.S. 374, 374-83 (1969); Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967);
United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 120 (1966); Pollard v. United States, 352 U.S. 354,
361-62 (1957); United States v. Provoo, 350 U.S. 857 (mem.) (per curiam), aff'g Petition
of Provoo, 17 F.R.D. 183 (1955); Beavers v. Haubert, 198 U.S. 77 (1905).
The speedy trial clause has been somewhat more frequently the subject of critical
commentary. See, e.g., Amsterdam, Speedy Criminal Trial: Rights and Remedies, 27
STAN. L. REV. 525 (1975); Arkin, Speedy Criminal Appeal: A Right Without a Remedy,
74 MINN. L. REV. 437 (1990); Godbold, Speedy Trial - Major Surgery for a National Ill,
24 ALA. L. REV. 265 (1972); Note, The Right to a Speedy Criminal Trial, 57 COLUM. L.
REV. 846 (1957); Note, The Right to a Speedy Trial, 20 STAN. L. REV. 476 (1968); Note,
The Lagging Right to a Speedy Trial, 51 VA. L. REV. 1587 (1965).
23 See, e.g., Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374, 374-75 (1969); Klopfer v. North Carolina,
386 U.S. 213, 222-26 (1967).
24 United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 313 (1971) ("the Sixth Amendment speedy
trial provision has no application until the putative defendant in some way becomes 'ac-
cused' "). The question whether the speedy trial clause applied to pre-arrest and pro-
indictment delay was the subject of much of the speedy trial commentary prior to 1971.
[Vol. 56: 439
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exclusive remedy for a speedy trial violation.2 5
The Court has not attempted to give precise content to this
sixth amendment right for two principal reasons. First, as the
Court has noted, "a speedy trial" is a relative2  and inexact
term. In addition, unlike most other procedural protections ac-
corded criminal defendants, the speedy trial guarantee is a
double-edged sword. Pretrial delay, the danger against which the
right is designed to protect, often works to the advantage of a
criminal defendant, particularly one who is at liberty while
awaiting trial.2 8 The passage of time may cause the government
to lose evidence or even, in some cases, to lose interest in pursu-
ing the case. Many defendants therefore welcome pretrial delay
or even take steps to secure it. These considerations led the
Court in Barker v. Wingo29 to endorse an ad hoc "balancing
test.""0 Barker requires a court to weigh "the conduct of both
See, e.g., Widman, The Right to a Speedy Triak Pre-Indictment and Pre-Arrest Delay,
7 AN. CRm. LQ. 248 (1969); Comment, Pre-Arrest Delays and the Right to Speedy Ar-
rest: Apologia Pro Vita Ross, 11 Aiuz. L REv. 770 (1969); Note, Constitutional Limits on
Pre-Arrest Delay, 51 IowA L REv. 670 (1966); Note, Pre-Arrest Delay. Evolving Due-
Process Standards, 43 N.Y.U. L lv. 722 (1968); Note, Justice Overdue - Speedy Trial
for the Potential Defendant, 5 STAN. L. REv. 95 (1952).
11 Strunk v. United States, 412 U.S. 434, 440 (1973) ("In light of the policies which
underlie the right to a speedy trial, dismissal must remain... the only possible rem-
edy.") (citation omitted). This decision was cogently criticized by Anthony Amsterdam
fifteen years ago and his criticisms remain apt. See Amsterdam, supra note 22, at 532-39.
Professor Amsterdam argues that the dismissal of an indictment with prejudice is usu-
ally inappropriate when a speedy trial violation is called to the court's attention in ad-
vance of trial. Unless pretrial delay has occasioned the loss of evidence helpful to the
accused or has otherwise impaired his defense, "the primary form of judicial relief
against denial of a speedy trial should be to expedite the trial, not to abort it." Id. at
535. The absence of a less drastic remedy invariably affects how courts define the con-
tent of the speedy trial right- loathe to dismiss prosecutions, courts will refuse to find a
violation except where pretrial delays are egregious. Id. at 525, 54041. As a result, the
speedy trial clause affords comparatively little protection from undue delay in criminal
prosecutions. Id. at 526.
"' See, e.g., Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 522 (1972) ('The right of a speedy trial is
necessarily relative ... and depends upon circumstances.") (quoting Beavers v.
Haubert, 198 U.S. 77, 87 (1905)); Pollard v. United States, 352 U.S. 354, 361 (1957)
("Whether delay in completing a prosecution such as here occurred amounts to an un-
constitutional deprivation of rights depends upon the circumstances.").
27 See, e.g., Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 521-22 (1972) (characterizing speedy trial
right as "vague," "amorphous" and "slippery," and noting that "[i]t is... impossible to
determine with precision when the right has been denied.").
See id. at 519-21.
29 407 U.S. 514 (1972).
30 Id. at 530.
1990]
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the prosecution and the defendant" to determine whether pre-
trial delay is constitutionally excessive.31 In adopting this test,
the Court rejected two alternative formulations: the first would
have required all trials to be held within a specific period of time
after arrest or indictment;32 the second would have applied the
right only to those defendants who had demanded a speedy trial,
while finding that all others had waived the right.3
The Barker Court listed four factors relevant to the speedy
trial calculus, while cautioning that the list was not exclusive.3 4
The first factor, the length of the pretrial delay, was said to be
"a triggering mechanism": unless the delay was long enough to
be "presumptively prejudicial," no further inquiry was neces-
sary.35 The second factor was the reason for the delay:
A deliberate attempt to delay the trial in order to hamper the defense
should be weighted heavily against the government. A more neutral
reason such as negligence or overcrowded courts should be weighted
less heavily but nevertheless should be considered since the ultimate
responsibility for such circumstances must rest with the government
rather than with the defendant. Finally, a valid reason, such as a
missing witness, should serve to justify appropriate delay."
31 Id.
32 Id. at 523, 529.
11 Id. at 523-30. In Phillips v. United States, 201 F. 259, 262 (8th Cir. 1912), the
Eighth Circuit became the first federal court of appeals to hold that the defendant could
not complain of pretrial delay that elapsed prior to his "demand" for a trial. This rule
was subsequently adopted by other federal courts, including the Second Circuit. See,
e.g., United States v. Maxwell, 383 F.2d 437 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1057
(1968).
" Barker, 407 U.S. at 530, 533. The Barker test closely tracked the standard that
had previously been adopted by the Second Circuit in United States ex rel. Von Cseh v.
Fay, 313 F.2d 620 (2d Cir. 1963). In that case, the court of appeals stated that determi-
nations of speedy trial motions should be based on a consideration of four factors: "the
length of delay, the reason for the delay, the prejudice to the defendant, and waiver by
the defendant." Id. at 623. Accord Note, The Right to a Speedy Criminal Trial, supra
note 22, at 861-63. This standard was applied several times by the court of appeals prior
to the decision in Barker. See, e.g., United States v. DeMasi, 445 F.2d 251, 255 (2d Cir.
1971); United States ex rel. Solomon v. Mancusi, 412 F.2d 88, 90 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
396 U.S. 936 (1969); United States v. Simmons, 338 F.2d 804, 807 (2d Cir. 1964), cert.
denied, 380 U.S. 983 (1965).
35 Barker, 407 U.S. at 530.
36 Id. at 531 (footnote omitted). See also Strunk v. United States, 412 U.S. 434, 436
(1973) ("Unintentional delays caused by overcrowded court dockets or understaffed
prosecutors are among the factors to be weighed less heavily than intentional delay, cal-




The third factor was "whether and how" the defendant asserted
his speedy trial right:17 A defendant who knowingly failed to ob-
ject to pretrial delay should rarely be able to prove that he was
denied a speedy trial,38 whereas a defendant who frequently and
vociferously objected to delay should be assumed to have suf-
fered a more serious deprivation." The last factor was whether
the defendant had been prejudiced by the delay, including, most
importantly, whether the passage of time had impaired his
defense.40
When fugitive defendants claim that the government failed
to pursue them diligently enough and so must be blamed for de-
laying the trial, a court must determine how to apply the second
factor in the Barker calculus-whether the government caused
the pretrial delay and had no valid reason for doing so. Although
the Court has never addressed this question in the context of a
speedy trial claim brought by a fugitive defendant, it has consid-
ered a number of cases in which the prosecution's accountability
for pretrial delay was at issue, including cases where it was ar-
gued that the prosecution had a duty to take affirmative mea-
sures to expedite the trial.
In several of the Court's cases, the prosecution's affirmative
conduct was the cause of the pretrial delay. In such situations,
the prosecution will be held accountable for the delay unless it
had a good reason for acting as it did.," For example, the prose-
cution was held accountable for delay in one of the Court's earli-
est cases, United States v. Prooo,42 which summarily affirmed a
Maryland district court's dismissal of an indictment.43 The de-
fendant in Provoo had been imprisoned for five years while
awaiting trial in an inappropriate venue. The government was
found to have deliberately proceeded in the Southern District of
37 Barker, 407 U.S. at 531.
Id. at 529, 532 ("[F]ailure to assert the right will make it difficult for a defendant
to prove that he was denied a speedy trial").
11 Id. at 531 ("The more serious the deprivation, the more likely a defendant is to
complain.").
40 Id. at 533.
41 See, e.g., Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 214, 226 (1967) (the prosecu-
tion did not have a valid reason to indefinitely postpone criminal proceedings).
42 350 U.S. 857 (mem.) (per curiam), aft Petition of Provoo, 17 F.R.D. 183 (1955).
", The Supreme Court did not issue an opinion in Prouoo, but the district court's




New York, where venue was doubtful, in order to gain a strate-
gic advantage." In contrast, in a more recent speedy trial deci-
sion, United States v. Loud Hawk,45 the Court held that pretrial
delay caused by the government's interlocutory appeal of a sup-
pression order was justified because the appeal was taken in
good faith and, indeed, proved meritorious.48
A different and more difficult question arises in cases where
pretrial delay is not attributable to affirmative conduct by the
prosecution. Where the impediments to a prompt trial are not
initially imposed by the prosecution, will the prosecution never-
theless be blamed for failing to remove them? In some instances,
4, Petition of Provoo, 17 F.R.D. 183, 201 (D. Md.), afl'd per curiam, 350 U.S. 857
(1955). Provoo, a sergeant in the U.S. Army, was captured by the Japanese in May 1942
and held as a prisoner of war until August 1945, during which time he allegedly worked
for the Japanese as an interpreter, guide, and advisor, and reported on the activities of
other prisoners, providing information about secret codes as well as denouncing another
prisoner of war who was then executed by the Japanese. Provoo was arrested by the
army in August 1945 and held in custody until April 1946, when, having seemingly been
exonerated, he was returned to the United States and, four months later, discharged. 17
F.R.D. at 185-87.
Provoo almost immediately reenlisted and, over the ensuing years, during which the
FBI initiated a treason investigation, Provoo was confined for substantial periods of time
on unrelated charges. In 1949, at a time when Provoo was confined at Fort Meade in
Maryland, officials of the Army and the Department of Justice decided that Provoo
would be released and charged as a civilian with treason, but that his release would take
place in New York, which was considered a more hospitable venue for the prosecution,
Id. at 187-92.
In September 1949, Provoo was transported from Fort Meade to Governor's Island,
New York, where he was required to accept an undesirable discharge and then immedi-
ately arrested by the FBI. He was charged with treason in the Southern District of New
York and held without ball. Trial did not begin until October 1952, despite the defend-
ant's requests to be tried sooner. Provoo disintegrated emotionally during his confine-
ment. He was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment early the next year. Id. at
192-94.
Thereafter, Provoo sought a new trial on the basis of newly discovered information
about his transfer from Fort Meade to New York. Id. at 194. Although the district court
denied the motion in May 1954, the Second Circuit overturned Provoo's conviction three
months later. While its decision was based on the erroneous admission of evidence of
Provoo's homosexuality, the court also observed that venue in New York had been im-
proper. United States v. Provoo, 215 F.2d 531, 538-39 (2d Cir. 1954).
Provoo was then indicted in the District of Maryland and transported there to be
retried. 17 F.R.D. at 194-95. Finding that Provoo's mental health had deteriorated to the
point where he could barely assist in his own defense, that defense witnesses had died,
and that there had been unnecessary delays in indicting him and bringing him to trial,
the district court held that Provoo had been denied his right to a speedy trial and there-
fore dismissed the indictment. Id. at 203.
45 474 U.S. 302 (1986).
46 Id. at 316-17.
[Vol. 56: 439
FUGITIVE DEFENDANTS
the prosecution will not be blamed. For example, in Pollard v.
United States,7 the Court found that the prosecutor was not to
blame for a two-year delay between the imposition of an illegal
sentence and a subsequent resentencing at which the defendant
was treated more harshly. The five-Justice majority found that
the delay was merely "accidental" and not the responsibility of
the government. ' Likewise, in Loud Hawk,'0 the Court held
that pretrial delay caused by the defendants' interlocutory ap-
peal from the denial of their motion to dismiss the indictment
could not be counted in support of the speedy trial claim. 0
In Pollard and Loud Hawk, the prosecution's failure to act
was not unreasonable. In Pollard, for example, the prosecution
was apparently unaware of the need for resentencing. And, in
Loud Hawk, there was nothing the prosecution could have done
to expedite the trial beyond opposing the defendants' interlocu-
tory appeal. In other circumstances, however, there may be mea-
sures reasonably available to prosecutors to avert pretrial delay.
The question is whether the prosecution must take such mea-
sures even though it did not cause the delay. At least in some
cases, the answer is that the government must, indeed, do so.
In Smith v. Hooey,5' the Court held that a Texas state pros-
ecutor was to blame for pretrial delay occasioned by his failure
to attempt to secure the presence of an indicted defendant who
4Y 352 U.S. 354 (1957).
'I Id. at 361-62. Pollard was convicted of unlawfully taking and embezzling a Trea-
sury check, an offense which he committed during a two-week drinking spree. At the
time of sentencing, Pollard was completing a state prison term, and the district judge,
impressed by Pollard's recent participation in Alcoholics Anonymous, appeared to decide
not to impose any additional punishment. After Pollard was taken from the courtroom,
however, in response to the prosecutor's request for clarification, the judge imposed three
years' probation to commence upon Pollard's release from state custody. Because of Pol-
lard's absence from the courtroom, that sentence was invalid. Id. at 355.56.
Two years later, Pollard was arrested for violating probation. He was brought before
the sentencing judge, who resentenced him on the original embezzlement charge to two
years' imprisonment. In challenging this sentence, Pollard argued, among other things,
that the sentencing delay violated his sixth amendment right to a speedy trial. Id. at
356-57, 361. The majority rejected this argument, distinguishing Pollard's situation from
previous cases in which the delay was deliberately caused by the government. Id. at 362.
In contrast, four dissenting justices blamed the government for its failure to take step3 to
have the original sentence corrected after being put on notice of the defect in that sen-
tence. Id. at 368 (Warren, C.J., dissenting).
49 474 U.S. 302 (1986).
50 Id. at 316-17.
51 393 U.S. 374 (1969).
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was serving a federal prison sentence.2 The Court rejected the
argument that the prosecutor was not required to ask federal
authorities to make Smith available for trial in Texas because a
state court had no power to order Smith's production. s In the
Supreme Court's view, this reasoning foundered on the reality
that, upon request, the Bureau of Prisons would almost certainly
have produced Smith in accordance with its normal procedure,
even though it was not legally obliged to do so.4 By simply and
inexpensively obtaining a writ of habeas corpus ad prose-
quendum from the state court and forwarding the writ to federal
prison authorities, the prosecution could almost have guaranteed
Smith's prompt appearance at state criminal proceedings."
The Smith Court drew an analogy between the prosecu-
tion's duty to try to secure the presence of an imprisoned de-
fendant and the prosecution's duty under the confrontation
clause to try to secure the presence of an imprisoned witness."'
In Barber v. Page,57 decided one year before Smith v. Hooey, the
Court held that the prosecution could not introduce a transcript
of testimony given at a previous proceeding in place of a wit-
ness's live testimony unless the prosecutor first "made a good-
faith effort to obtain [the witness's] presence at trial."58 More-
over, the state prosecutor's duty to undertake such an effort was
11 Id. at 382-83. Prior to the decision in Smith, this question had occasioned consid-
erable critical discussion. See, e.g., Schindler, Interjurisdictional Conflict and the Right
to a Speedy Trial, 35 U. CIN. L. REv. 179 (1966); Walther, Detainer Warrants and the
Speedy Trial Provision, 46 MARQ. L. REv. 423 (1963); Note, Convicts-The Right to a
Speedy Trial and the New Detainer Statutes, 18 RUTGERS L. REV. 828 (1964); Note,
Effective Guaranty of a Speedy Trial for Convicts in Other Jurisdictions, 77 YALE L.J.
767 (1968). For commentary following the Court's decision, see Tuttle, Catch 2254: Fed-
eral Jurisdiction and Interstate Detainers, 32 U. Prrr. L. REV. 489 (1971); Comment,
The Convict's Right to a Speedy Trial, 61 J. Cram. L.. CRIMINOLOGY & PoL. ScI. 352
(1970).
1 Smith, 393 U.S. at 380. Smith was indicted in Texas in 1960 on a charge of theft,
Immediately upon learning of the charge, he requested a speedy trial. Although Smith
was promised a trial within two weeks after he appeared in court, the state took no steps
to secure his appearance. For seven years, Smith wrote periodically to request a trial, but
to no avail. Finally, he moved to dismiss the charges for want of prosecution, but the
Texas Supreme Court denied relief on the basis of one of its earlier decisions, Cooper v.
State, 400 S.W.2d 890 (Tex. 1966). 393 U.S. at 375-77.
Smith, 393 U.S. at 381 & n.13.
" Id. at 380-81 & nn.11 & 13.
" Id. at 381-83.




not excused by the fact that the witness was in federal prison.,,
Reliance on the state court's absence of authority to compel the
witness's attendance was thought to be inappropriate in light of
the "increased cooperation between the States themselves and
between the States and Federal Government.!" The Smith
Court quoted at length from this decision 1 and then echoed its
language, concluding that "[u]pon the petitioner's demand,
Texas had a constitutional duty to make a diligent, good-faith
effort to bring him before the Harris County court for trial." 2
In a decision the following year, the Court relied on Smith
but characterized its holding narrowly. The defendant in Dickey
v. Florida,63 while serving a federal prison sentence, had made
repeated requests over a seven-year period to be tried on charges
pending in Florida. By the time the state prosecutor arranged
for Dickey's production, potential defense witnesses had died or
could not be located.6 The Court overturned Dickey's convic-
tion, finding that "no valid reason for the delay existed; it was
exclusively for the convenience of the State."6 5 But, in the
course of its opinion, it characterized the holding of Smith, on
which it relied, as follows: "on demand a State ha[s] a duty to
make a diligent and good-faith effort to secure the presence of
the accused from the custodial jurisdiction and afford him a
trial.168 Under this formulation, the prosecution's affirmative
duty to bring an absent defendant to trial would be quite lim-
ited. The Smith Court did not hold that the prosecution had
9 Id. at 724.
60 Id. at 723.
es Smith, 393 U.S. at 381-83.
2 Id. at 383.
63 398 U.S. 30 (1970).
"Id. at 32-36.
65 Id. at 38. Three years later, in Moore v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 25 (1973), the Court
considered yet another case in which the prosecution had delayed in obtaining the pre3-
ence of a defendant who was imprisoned in another jurisdiction. Moore was not tried
until almost three years after he was charged with murder in Aizona and 28 months
after he first demanded to be brought from state prison in California to be tried on the
charges. The Court found that the state court, in rejecting Moore's speedy trial claim,
had misread Barker v. Wingo to require a showing that the defense was impaired before
a defendant could prevail on such a claim. Id. at 25-26. The Court explained that
prejudice was only one of several factors to be considered and that, in any event, impair-
ment of the defense was only one possible prejudice contemplated by the speedy trial
clause. Id. at 26-27. The Court remanded to the state court for its reconsideration of
Moore's claim in light of Smith v. Hooey, Barker v. Wingo and Dickey. Id. at 28.
'6 398 U.S. at 37 (emphasis added).
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any duty with respect to absent defendants who were at liberty,
but only that the prosecution must try to secure the presence of
those who were imprisoned. 7
Since deciding Smith v. Hooey and Dickey v. Florida, the
Supreme Court has not had occasion to determine, in general,
whether the prosecution's affirmative obligation to obtain a de-
fendant's presence at trial goes beyond the issuance of writs for
imprisoned defendants. Nor has the Court considered, in partic-
ular, whether steps must be taken to apprehend a defendant
who is evading criminal charges. Justice Brennan alluded to this
issue, however, in an extensive concurring opinion in Dickey. In
his concurring opinion, which was designed "to point out certain
of the major problems that courts must consider in defining the
speedy-trial guarantee," 8 Justice Brennan gave particular con-
sideration to what might constitute valid reasons for pretrial de-
lay."' Among other things, he noted that the speedy trial right
might not apply where the defendant "has, or shares, responsi-
bility" for pretrial delay, such as "when delay results from his
being a fugitive from justice ... ,"70 Thus, this jurist, known
for strongly advocating the rights of criminal defendants, ex-
pressed doubt about the right of a fugitive defendant to com-
plain about pretrial delay.
Against this background of Supreme Court precedent, in-
cluding the narrowly construed holding of Smith v. Hooey and
Justice Brennan's expression of skepticism, the Second Circuit
would later be called on to decide whether to charge the govern-
ment with an affirmative responsibility to pursue fugitive de-
fendants in a diligent manner.
11 Under this formulation, the prosecution also would not have to secure the pres-
ence of incarcerated defendants who made no "demand" for trial. However, this limita-
tion on the affirmative duty recognized in Smith v. Hooey was eliminated by the Court's
rejection of the "demand-waiver" rule in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 524-28 (1972).
But see United States v. McConahy, 505 F.2d 770, 773 (7th Cir. 1974) ("In a sense the
delay resulting from a defendant's imprisonment in another jurisdiction is attributable
to him.").
398 U.S. at 41 (Brennan, J., concurring).
" Id. at 48, 51-52 (Brennan, J., concurring).
70 Id. at 48 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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II. THE SPEEDY TRIAL RIGHTS OF FUGITIVES: THE VIEW OUTSmE
THE SECOND CIRCUIT
A defendant's flight from prosecution has traditionally been
viewed as wrongful conduct. At common law, a fugitive was
treated quite harshly. If absent, a defendant could be convicted
of the charges against him through the process of outlawry .1
Moreover, he would be punished more severely than if he had
been convicted after trial: If the absconding defendant failed to
respond to summonses issued by five consecutive county courts,
all his goods and chattels would be forfeited and he would be
sentenced, in a misdemeanor case, to perpetual imprisonment,
or, in a felony case, to death. 2
In this country, the remedy of outlawry was never adopted
by the federal courts and used only rarely by early state courts.7 3
However, the deliberate refusal to answer criminal charges has
been considered wrongful conduct that is subject to conventional
sanctions. For example, a defendant who fails to appear in court
after having been served with a summons may be punished for
contempt of court,74 while a defendant who absconds after hav-
ing been released on bail may be punished for "bail jumping.'"7
Moreover, criminal sanctions are not limited to those fugitive
defendants who have defied a judicial order or received notice to
appear in court. It is a federal crime to "move[] or travel[] in
interstate or foreign commerce with intent. . . to avoid prosecu-
tion .... ,,76 This statute applies even where the defendant flees
before being formally charged with a crime. 7 Thus, a fugitive
7' See Rex v. Wilkes, 98 Eng. Rep. 327, 339 (LB. 1770) (Mansfield, L.C.J.).
72 Id. See also Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 170-71 (1958); United States v.
Lockwood, 382 F. Supp. 1111, 1117-18 (E.D.N.Y. 1974) (Weinstein, J.) (citing BLACK-
STONE'S COMMNTARIES ON THE LAW, ch. XXIV, 886-88 (Gavit ed. 1941)).
11 See United States v. Hall, 198 F.2d 726, 727-28 (2d Cir. 1952) ('IDuring the
nineteenth century [outlawry] was either abolished or fell into disuse... and of course
today has only an historical interest.").
"' See, e.g.. 18 U.S.C. § 401 (1988). Cf. Green, 356 U.S. at 188-89 (contempt-of-court
statute extends to disobedience of surrender orders).
75 18 U.S.C. § 3146 (1986); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3150 (1966) repealed by Pub. L. No.
98-473, title H, § 203(a), 98 Stat. 1976 (1984).
76 18 U.S.C. § 1073 (1988). Interstate flight to avoid prosecution was initially made a
federal crime by the Fugitive Felon Act of 1934. Pub. L. No. 233, 48 Stat. 782 (1934).
" United States v. Frank, 864 F.2d 992, 1007 (3d Cir. 1988) ("Congress did not in-
tend section 1073 to apply only to flight to avoid formally pending ...charges.");
United States v. Bando, 244 F.2d 833, 842-43 (2d Cir.) (In construing section 1073, "[t]he
words 'to avoid prosecution' [do not mean] 'to avoid a pending prosecution." (emphasis
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defendant who acts evasively to avoid arrest and prosecution en-
gages in conduct that is viewed as wrongful, and is thus subject
to punishment. 8
The moral premise of these criminal provisions-that an in-
dividual acts wrongfully, indeed criminally, by fleeing from pros-
ecution-has also been a part of the procedural law governing
the timing of criminal trials. Until the 1960s, legal protections
against pretrial delay generally could not be invoked by a de-
fendant whose absence from trial was caused by his own flight
from the jurisdiction or by other efforts on his part to avoid ar-
rest. This principle was not qualified by any duty on the part of
the sovereign to pursue the defendant diligently.
This principle finds its clearest expression in the statutes of
limitations which apply to criminal cases. While requiring that
an indictment be returned within a specific time after the com-
mission of a criminal offense, statutes of limitations in this coun-
try have excluded the period of pre-indictment delay when the
defendant was a fugitive. For example, at the time of the adop-
tion of the Bill of Rights, the federal statute of limitations
adopted by the first Congress required noncapital offenses to be
indicted within two years of the offense and capital offenses,
other than murder or forgery, to be indicted within three years
of the offense, "[p]rovided that nothing herein contained shall
extend to any person or persons fleeing from justice.1 79 Many
in original)), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 844 (1957).
71 There are only a handful of reported decisions in which defendants have been
prosecuted under this statute. See, e.g., United States v. Frank, 864 F.2d 992 (3d Cir.
1988); United States v. Bando, 244 F.2d 833 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 844 (1957).
The primary purpose of section 1073 is to provide a jurisdictional basis for the Federal
Bureau of Investigation to assist state authorities by apprehending fugitives from state
prosecution. After a defendant is arrested under section 1073 for having fled from state
prosecution, he is usually returned to the state for trial and the federal charge is dis-
missed. See generally United States v. Frank, 864 F.2d at 996-97.
71 An Act for the Punishment of certain Crimes against the United States, ch. 9, §
32, 1 Stat. 112 (Apr. 30, 1790). See. e.g, United States v. White, 28 F. Cas. 550, 551
(C.C.D.C. 1836) (No. 16,675).
This limitation on the reach of the federal statute of limitations has continued until
the present day and is now embodied in 18 U.S.C. § 3290 (1988), which provides: "No
statute of limitations shall extend to any person fleeing from justice." In Jhirad v. Fer-
randina, 486 F.2d 442, 444-45 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 833 (1976), the Sec-
ond Circuit acknowledged the reasonableness of this tolling provision:
The phrase 'fleeing from justice' carries a common sense connotation that only
those persons shall be denied the benefit of the statute of limitations who have
absented themselves from the jurisdiction of the crime with the intent of es-
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state statutes of limitations in the nineteenth century contained
similarly worded provisions."a
Although proof of the prosecution's failed efforts to arrest
the defendant might be useful to establish that the defendant
had in fact fled from justice,8 courts interpreting these excep-
tions to the statute of limitations did not condition their appli-
cation on the government's demonstration that it had made suit-
able efforts to locate and apprehend the defendant.82 Moreover,
the tolling provisions applied not only when the defendant de-
fied the court itself by jumping bail, but also when the defend-
ant absconded before he could be arrested and brought before
the court.8 A defendant acted wrongfully by fleeing from prose-
cution and thereby forfeited or waived the right to an expedi-
tious resolution of the criminal charges.8'
Similarly, at least until the 1960s, fugitives were denied the
benefit of state statutory provisions requiring a trial to be held
within a specified period following indictment.85 The prosecution
caping prosecution. It does not appear to us to be unreasonable to provide for
tolling of the statute of limitations when a person leaves the place of his al-
leged offense to avoid prosecution or arrest and for not tolling the statute when
a person without such purpose of escaping punishment merely moves openly to
another place of residence.
80 See, e.g., § 1666 Gantt's Digest (quoted in Lay v. State, 42 Ark. 105, 108 (183));
Act of 1805 (quoted in State v. Foster, 7 La. Ann. 255, 256 (1852)); LA. REv. STAT. 986
(quoted in State v. Vines, 34 La. Ann. 1073, 1075 (1882)); Mo. Ray. STAT. 1879, § 1706
(quoted in State v. Harvell, 89 Mo. 588, 589, 1 S.W. 837, 838 (1886)).
Some states had even broader tolling provisions which applied whenever the defend-
ant was absent from the state, regardless of whether the defendant intended by his ab-
sence to avoid arrest. See, e.g., CAL. CRta. PRAC. AcT § 99 (Wood's Dig. 278) (quoted in
People v. Montejo, 18 Cal. 38, 40 (1861)).
8, State v. Foster, 8 La. Ann. 290, 291-92 (1853) (governor's proclamation offering
reward for defendant's apprehension was properly received in evidence to prove that
defendant had fled from justice).
82 In Howgate v. United States, 7 App. D.C. 271, 240.48 (1895), the court found that
a fugitive defendant could not claim the benefit of the federal statute of limitations even
though government officers not only failed to seek his arrest, but assisted his flight from
the jurisdiction.
8 See, e.g., State v. Barton, 32 La. Ann. 278, 279 (1880).
"See, e.g., Howgate v. United States, 7 App. D.C. at 245 ("[F]leeing from justice is
itself a wrongful act, although perhaps not always a criminal one; and we fail to see the
harshness of the law which holds a person to the just legal consequences of his own
wrongful act.").
5 See, e.g., Ex parte Gere, 221 P. 689, 691 (Ca. Dist. Ct. App. 1923); State ex rel.
Trester v. Leidigh, 53 Neb. 148, 150, 73 N.W. 545, 54546 (1897); State v. Swain, 147 Or.
207, 213-14, 31 P.2d 745, 748 (1934); Commonwealth v. Hale, 13 Phila. 452, 453 (1879).
See also State v. Arthur, 21 Iowa 322, 324 (1886).
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would, of course, be required to show that the defendant had in
fact been a fugitive during the period of pretrial delay, and to
make this showing, the prosecution might offer proof of its un-
successful efforts to locate the defendant. But once it was estab-
lished that the defendant was fleeing or concealing himself, the
prosecution did not have to make efforts to apprehend the
defendant."'
For many years, courts interpreting the constitutional right
to a speedy trial held that fugitive defendants may not complain
of pretrial delay.8 7 Courts gave two principal reasons why the
speedy trial right was unavailable to a fugitive defendant: First,
the defendant's flight was thought of as an implied waiver of the
speedy trial right."' Second, the defendant's flight was viewed as
a sufficient justification or excuse for pretrial delay.80 Because
It made sense that if fugitives were to be denied the benefits of statutes of limita-
tions, they should also be denied the benefits of speedy trial statutes. Indeed, there is a
stronger justification for delaying the start of trial on account of a defendant's flight than
there is for delaying the filing of an indictment. An indictment can be filed in the de-
fendant's absence, but a trial generally cannot start unless the defendant is there. Thus,
a fugitive defendant's successful evasion would effectively preclude the commencement
of trial.
" See, e.g., Ex parte Gere, 221 P. 689 (Ca. Dist. Ct. App. 1923). In Gere the court
considered whether the prosecution had exercised reasonable diligence in its attempt to
locate the defendant. But it apparently did so, not because it believed that the prosecu-
tion had a duty to pursue a fugitive defendant, but because the defendant had denied
having tried to avoid arrest. Had the defendant in fact been living openly in the jurisdic-
tion, as he claimed, then the prosecution would have been obliged to take reasonable
measures to secure his presence at trial. Thus, the court found two independent grounds
for denying the defendant's speedy trial claim. First, the defendant's own wrongdoing
had contributed to the pretrial delay, because he had adopted fictitious names in order
to avoid arrest. Second, the prosecution had, in any event, made adequate efforts to
apprehend him. Id. at 692.
87 See, e.g., Morland v. United States, 193 F.2d 297 (10th Cir. 1951); Shepherd v.
United States, 163 F.2d 974, 976 (8th Cir. 1947); Hart v. United States, 183 F. 368, 370
(6th Cir. 1910); Flagg v. State, 11 Ga. App. 37, 39, 74 S.E. 562, 562 (1912); Chelf v. State,
58 N.E.2d 353, 355 (Ind. 1944); State v. Swain, 147 Or. 207, 214, 31 P.2d 745, 748 (1934);
Crookham v. State, 5 W. Va. 510, 514 (1871); State v. Reynolds, 28 Wis. 2d 350, 355, 137
N.E.2d 14, 16 (1965); State v. Keefe, 98 P. 122, 127 (Wyo. 1980).
" See, e.g., Thornton v. State, 7 Ga. App. 752, 753, 67 S.E. 1055, 1056 (1910). See
also Morland v. United States, 193 F.2d at 298; Shepherd v. United States, 163 F.2d at
976.
8 See, e.g., Shepherd v. United States, 163 F.2d at 976; State v. Swain, 31 P.2d at
748; State v. Reynolds, 28 Wis. 2d at 355, 137 N.W.2d at 16.
One court offered a third rationale when it held that a fugitive defendant could not
invoke the speedy trial right because "only the time spent in custody, in one form or
another, is considered" in determining whether the right has been violated. State v.
Reynolds, 28 Wis. 2d at 355, 137 N.W.2d at 16. This view was premised on a narrow, and
[Vol. 56:439
FUGITIVE DEFENDANTS
the early decisions took the view that a defendant should not be
afforded relief from pretrial delay that he deliberately caused, a
fugitive defendant's speedy trial claim could be denied out of
hand; it was unnecessary for a court to consider whether or not
the prosecution had taken steps to apprehend the defendant."'
Thus, until the late 1960s, there was never any suggestion in the
case law that a fugitive defendant's inability to invoke the
speedy trial right was somehow dependent on the government's
exercise of "due diligence" in pursuit of him.
Two legal events apparently affected the lower courts'
thinking, however, and led some of them to give consideration to
the concept of prosecutorial "due diligence." The first event was
the ABA's adoption of standards for speedy trials in 1968."1
These standards became the model for court rules and legisla-
tion, including the federal Speedy Trial Act, which sought to
give criminal defendants greater protection than was afforded by
the sixth amendment right to a speedy trial. 2 The ABA stan-
dards provide that a trial must generally commence within a
specific period of time following a defendant's arrest or indict-
ment.9" They also enumerate specific justifications for greater
periods of delay.94
Both the ABA standards and the Speedy Trial Act address
delay caused by the absence of a fugitive defendant. In the case
of a fugitive defendant whose whereabouts are unknown, they
preserve the traditional principle that the defendant may not
complain about pretrial delay, regardless of whether the govern-
ment has taken steps to locate him. 5 They depart from this
now discarded, conception of the function of the speedy trial right: it presupposed that
the right was designed only to protect the accused against a lengthy period of constraint
while awaiting trial. So construed, the function of the speedy trial right would not be
served by applying it to an individual who was at large during the course of pretrial
delay.
90 See, e.g., Shepherd v. United States, 163 F.2d at 976; Thornton v. State, 7 Ga.
App. at 753, 67 S.E.2d at 1056; State v. Swain, 31 P.2d at 748; State v. Reynolds, 28 Wis.
2d at 355, 137 N.W.2d at 16. Compare People v. Buckley, 116 Cal. 146, 47 P. 1003 (1897)
(delay attributable to witness's absence justified only if government diligently seeks the
witness).
"I Standards Relating to Speedy Trial (1968).
92 On the inadequacy of the speedy trial clause to remedy any but the most egre-
gious pretrial delay, see Amsterdam, supra note 22.
93 Standards Relating to Speedy Trial § 2.2 (1968).
Id. at § 2.3.
91 See id. § 2.3(e); Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-3174, § 3161(h)(3)(B) (1985).
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traditional approach, however, in the case of a fugitive defend-
ant whose whereabouts are known but who cannot be arrested
because he is beyond the court's process. In such a case, the fu-
gitive defendant is treated much like an absent defendant who is
not deliberately evading prosecution. 6 Like a defendant who is
unaware that he has been charged, a fugitive defendant living
openly outside the jurisdiction must be pursued. Pretrial delay
is excused only if the fugitive defendant's presence cannot be
obtained by "due diligence" or if efforts to obtain the defend-
ant's presence are resisted. 7
It is unclear why the ABA rules departed from settled au-
thority. One possibility is that the drafters recognized the diffi-
culty of determining whether an individual residing openly
outside the jurisdiction is, in fact, a fugitive. In many cases, the
defendant may simply be unaware of the charges. Therefore, if
only to prove that the defendant is acting with the intent of
avoiding trial, the prosecution ordinarily would have to make at
least some effort to seek his presence. Another possible explana-
tion is that the ABA drafters believed that when the defendant
is living abroad at the time of indictment, it may be unfair to
equate him with those who flee or conceal themselves to avoid
prosecution. When the defendant's absence at the outset does
not reflect wrongful conduct, it may be considered reasonable to
put the burden on the prosecution to make some effort to com-
pel his appearance, rather than to require the defendant to bring
himself into the jurisdiction voluntarily.
The second event that apparently influenced some lower
courts was the Supreme Court's decision in Smith v. Hooey 8 in
1969. The principle established in Smith, that a prosecutor has a
This principle has also been preserved by most states which have adopted rules or
statutes governing speedy criminal trials. Many states provide that the right to a speedy
trial commences only after the defendant has been taken into custody. See, e.g., FLA. R.
CRIM. P. 3.191(a) (1989); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 103-5(a) (1976); IND. R. CmRI. P. 4(A)
(1974); KAN. STAT. ANN. 22-3402 (1981). Others provide that the right commences after
charges have been filed but does not apply to an absent defendant who seeks to avoid
prosecution. See, e.g., ALASKA R. CIM P. 45(d)(4) (1981); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-
405(6)(d) (1963); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 579 (West 1972); MASS. R. CRIM. P.
36(b)(2)(B) (1981); Mo. ANN. STAT, § 545.780(2) (Vernon 1982); N.Y. CRiM. PROC. §
30.30(4)(c) (McKinney 1981).
Standards Relating to Speedy Trial § 2.3(e); 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(3)(B) (1985).
91 Id. See note 137 infra.
" 393 U.S. 374 (1969).
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constitutional duty of "due diligence" to secure the presence of a
defendant who is incarcerated elsewhere in the country, could
not easily be limited. Courts quickly recognized that, for other
reasons, a defendant might have to rely on government interven-
tion to secure his appearance in court. Although the prosecution
in other situations might have to undertake more extensive or
expensive efforts than simply obtaining a writ of habeas corpus,
this alone was not considered a sufficient justification for cir-
cumscribing the prosecution's duty."9
Courts extending Smith v. Hooey have found that the gov-
ernment has a duty to seek the presence of a defendant who is
incarcerated abroad, at least in cases in which the defendant is
subject to extradition under treaty.100 Like the understandings
between states governing the rendition of incarcerated defend-
ants,10' extradition treaties provide a reasonable means of ob-
taining the defendant's presence, even if at somewhat greater
99 Id. at 380 n.11.
,00 See, e.g., United States v. McConahy, 505 F.2d 770,773 (7th Cir. 1974); Brown v.
Parratt, 406 F. Supp. 1357, 1359 (D. Neb. 1975); United States v. Raffone, 405 F. Supp.
549, 550-51 (S.D. Fla. 1975). See also United States v. Walton, 814 F.2d 376, 379-80 (7th
Cir. 1987) (interpreting Speedy Trial Act).
The Ninth Circuit has concluded, however, that where the defendant is not subject
to an extradition treaty, the government is not required to engage in diplomatic negotia-
tions to secure his return. See United States v. Saunders, 641 F.2d 659, 665 (9th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 918 (1981); United States v. Hooker, 607 F.2d 286, 286-89
(9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 905 (1980). In Hooker the court rejected the de-
fendant's argument that the government should have negotiated for his return from Peru
(after he was arrested there) so that he could be tried on narcotics charges pending in
Washington. Because Peru did not provide for extradition in narcotics cases, Hooker's
return could only have been secured through diplomatic negotiations. Relying on the
Second Circuit's decision in Salzmann, the court held that because of the executive
branch's exclusive competence in the field of foreign affairs, it would be improper "to
adopt a rule... that would, in substance, require the Attorney General or his agents to
embark on such negotiations, or require him to try to persuade the Department of State
to do so." 607 F.2d at 289-90.
1*, The interstate extradition process is not really one of comity; the extradition
clause of the United States Constitution, implemented by 18 U.S.C. § 3182 (1988), im-
poses an affirmative duty on all states to provide for interstate extradition. See US.
CONsT. art. IV, § 2, cl. 2 ("A person charged in any State... who shall flee from Justice,
and be found in another State, shall on Demand of the executive Authority of the State
from which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the State having Jurisdiction of
the Crime."). See also Appleyard v. Massachusetts, 203 U.S. 222, 227 (1906) (interpret-
ing extradition clause). In addition, most states have adopted the Uniform Extradition
Act (1926), which establishes extradition procedures ancillary to those provided for in
the federal implementing statute. See Am. Jr. 2d Desk Book, Item No. 124 (table indi-
cating which states have adopted the Uniform Extradition Act).
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expense.102 Courts have also found that the government must try
to locate defendants who are ignorant of the charges against
them and who, like prisoners, are therefore unable to appear in
court of their own volition.103 It might seem that a duty to try to
apprehend fugitive defendants is similarly a logical extension of
Smith v. Hooey.
In the years since the adoption of the ABA guidelines and
the decision in Smith v. Hooey, some courts deciding the speedy
trial claims of fugitive defendants have addressed the adequacy
of the prosecution's efforts to apprehend the defendant.104 It is
102 United States v. McConahy, 505 F.2d 770, 773 (7th Cir. 1974) ("There is no rea-
son not to apply the rule of Smith v. Hooey when the defendant is incarcerated by a
foreign government rather than the United States or one of its states .... [T]he addi-
tional expense is not a factor deserving of consideration .... "); United States v. Raf-
fone, 405 F. Supp. 549, 550 (S.D. Fla. 1975) (rejecting government's "explanation [that]
it 'seemed a better use of Government time and money to prosecute other cases, rather
than devote the same to the extremely complex and costly business of extradicting a
foreign felon.' ").
Mo' See, e.g., United States v. Bagga, 782 F.2d 1541, 1543, (11th Cir. 1986); United
States v. Greene, 737 F.2d 572, 575-76 (6th Cir. 1984); United States v. Deleon, 710 F.2d
1218, 1221-22 (7th Cir. 1983); United States v. Anderson, 627 F.2d 161, 163 (8th Cir.
1980); United States v. Parish, 468 F.2d 1129, 1134-35 (D.C. Cir. 1972); United States v.
McKinnon, No. 88-246-02 (E.D. Pa. filed June 6, 1989) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist
file); United States v. Leary, 695 F. Supp. 1250, 1253 (D. Me. 1988); United States v.
Alcantar-Lopez, 685 F. Supp. 181, 182 (N.D. IM. 1988); United States v. Yancy, 660 F.
Supp. 860, 862-63 (N.D. Ill. 1987); United States v. Agreda, 612 F. Supp. 153, 157-59
(E.D.N.Y. 1985); United States v. Judge, 425 F. Supp. 499, 501-02, 505 (D. Mass. 1976).
These decisions undertake little or no analysis but apparently view the duty to lo-
cate missing defendants as an obvious extension of Smith v. Hooey. For example, in
Deleon the Seventh Circuit simply noted: "[T]he Government under the Sixth Amend-
ment, has a 'constitutional duty to make a diligent good faith effort' to locate and appre-
hend a defendant and bring that defendant to trial." 710 F.2d at 1221 (citing, inter alia,
Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374 (1969)).
104 See, e.g., United States v. Brock, 782 F.2d 1442, 1445-46 & n.5 (7th Cir. 1986)
(Noting that "the government searched for Brock with due diligence" and finding that
"the delay between Brock's indictment and his transfer to federal custody was due to his
attempt to avoid arrest."); United States v. Weber, 479 F.2d 331, 332-33 (8th Cir. 1973)
("[T]he delay was directly caused by appellant himself .... There is nothing in this
record to warrant a holding ... that the government was dilatory in not making a dili-
gent effort to locate and apprehend Weber."); United States v. Steinberg, 478 F. Supp.
29, 32-33 (N.D. IlM. 1979) ("[S]tate department officials, acting in good faith, made infor-
mal and indirect approaches to Rhodesia in their effort to obtain Steinberg's return to
this jurisdiction. This was all they were obliged to do under the federal constitution and
laws."); United States v. Tate, 336 F. Supp. 58, 60-61 (E.D. Pa. 1971) ("[W]e find that
defendant was a fugitive and that reasonable efforts were made to locate him."). See also
United States v. Terrack, 515 F.2d 558, 559 (9th Cir. 1975) (After detailing government's
efforts to bring defendant to justice, the court concluded that defendant "cannot claim a
violation of his Sixth Amendment rights by reason of delays of his own making.").
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unclear, however, whether these courts believe that the prosecu-
tion is in fact under a duty of "due diligence."'' *° Outside the
Second Circuit, no court has expressly held that there is such a
duty. Nor has any court other than the trial court in Diacolios
actually found a violation of the speedy trial clause because of
the government's failure to take adequate steps to apprehend a
fugitive. Moreover, other courts have continued to reject speedy
trial claims brought by fugitive defendants without considering
the adequacy of the prosecution's efforts to apprehend them.100
Some of these decisions have explicitly characterized a defend-
ant's flight as a waiver of his speedy trial rights. 07 Others have
105 In some of these cases, the court's unexpressed legal premise seems to have been
that the prosecution did have such a duty. See, e.g., United States v. Steinberg, 478 F.
Supp. at 33. However, there are at least three other possible reasons why a court would
refer to the prosecution's efforts to find the defendant.
First, the court may have viewed the prosecution's diligence in pursuing the defend-
ant as an alternative ground for denying the defendant's speedy trial motion; in other
words, even if the defendant were not a fugitive, but simply an absent defendant, the
prosecution could not be blamed for the delay in bringing him to justice because it made
adequate efforts to locate him. See, e.g., United States v. Tate, 336 F. Supp. at 60-61.
Second, the court may simply have assumed, for purposes of argument, that the due
diligence standard applied, while finding that it was met. See, e.g., United States v.
Weber, 479 F.2d at 332-33 ("There is nothing in this record to warrant a holding, as
suggested by appellant, that the government vas dilatory in not making a diligent effort
to locate and apprehend Weber .... In any event we have difficulty in adopting the
rationale that an accused may purposefully obstruct justice by becoming a fugitive and
then complain because of the lapse of time between the filing of the indictment and the
date of the arrest.").
Finally, the court may have regarded the government's unsuccessful efforts to locate
the defendant as relevant to establishing that the defendant was, in fact, a fugitive. See,
e.g., United States v. Terrack, 515 F.2d at 559.
'" See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 543 F.2d 1171, 1174 (5th Cir. 1976) (per curiam)
(only issue considered is whether 13-month delay violated appellants due process
rights); United States v. Bey, 499 F.2d 194, 204 (3d Cir. 1974) (factors considered are
"the length of and reason for the delay, the defendant's assertion of his right and the
prejudice enuring to the defendant. .... ); United States v. Cartano, 420 F.2d 362, 363-
64 (1st Cir.) (no consideration of government's efforts to apprehend defendant), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 1054 (1970); Crowder v. United States, 383 A.2d 336, 339 & n.6 (D.C.
1978) (no consideration of government's efforts to apprehend defendant). See also
United States v. Sandini, 888 F.2d 300, 311 n.7 (3d Cir. 1989) ("We find it ironical that
Thomson [argues that defense counsel was ineffective in failing to raise a speedy trial
claim], as by far the most substantial part of the delay between indictment and trial vas
attributable to the fact that Thomson was a fugitive until he was arrested ...
107 See, e.g., United States v. DeTienne, 468 F.2d 151, 156 (7th Cir. 1972) (fugitive
defendant "clearly waived his right to a speedy trial"), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 911 (1973);
United States v. Judge, 425 F. Supp. 499, 502 (D. Mass. 1976) ("It is well established
that where the defendant's unlawful flight or hiding out is the reason for the delay in his
trial, he is held to have waived his right to a speedy trial.").
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found that Smith v. Hooey is inapplicable to fugitive defendants
because of the obvious difference between an incarcerated de-
fendant, like the ones in Smith and Dickey, and a fugitive de-
fendant who is aware of the charges and is willfully evading
prosecution. In the latter case, the defendant can appear of his
own volition, so the prosecution is not the only party capable of
providing for a prompt trial.108 Indeed, the defendant is in the
best position to do so.
III. THE SECOND CIRCUIT DECISIONS PRIOR TO DACOLIOS
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Barker v.
Wingo, l09 the Second Circuit's approach to the speedy trial right
was similar to that of most other federal courts. It frequently
applied a balancing test, like that later adopted in Barker, to
determine whether pretrial delay was constitutionally impermis-
sible.110 Among other things, the court recognized the impor-
tance of assigning responsibility for pretrial delay, because the
speedy trial clause provided no redress for "delay caused by or
consented to by a defendant." ' At the same time, anticipating
the Supreme Court's decision in Smith v. Hooey,112 the court
recognized that a defendant could not be blamed for delay
caused by his imprisonment by another sovereign, and that in
such cases, the government had a responsibility to make reason-
able efforts to obtain the incarcerated defendant's presence.1 13
In addition, like most other courts, the Second Circuit took an
expansive approach to waivers of the speedy trial right. It ap-
108 See, e.g., United States v. Steinberg, 478 F. Supp. 29, 32-33 (N.D. Ill. 1979)
(seven-year delay "was caused solely by" defendant's flight and unavailability, since he
was aware of the pending charges, financially able to return from Rhodesia to answer
them, and not under incarceration).
109 407 U.S. 514 (1972), discussed in notes 29-39 and accompanying text supra.
110 See note 34 supra.
" United States v. Kabot, 295 F.2d 848, 853 (2d Cir. 1961) (defendant who did not
move for a prompt hearing and who twice requested an adjournment of trial could not
complain of delay absent a showing of prejudice). See, e.g., United States v. Lustman,
258 F.2d 475, 477 (2d Cir.) (defendant cannot exploit a delay which is primarily attribu-
table to his own acts), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 880 (1958).
.12 393 U.S. 374 (1969).
"' See United States v. Simmons, 338 F.2d 804 (2d Cir. 1964) (delay between in-
dictment and arrest of defendant who had been in various state prisons was not the fault
of the government, which had spent the period attempting to locate the defendant), cert.
denied, 380 U.S. 983 (1965).
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plied the "demand-waiver" rule" 4 in order to ensure that the
speedy trial right would be used only as a shield and not as a
sword by criminal defendants."
In 1971, four years before the adoption of the federal
Speedy Trial Act, the Second Circuit took a more liberal ap-
proach to the speedy trial right by issuing detailed rules gov-
erning the expeditious resolution of criminal cases.11 0 The Sec-
ond Circuit's rules were inspired by, and largely patterned on,
the standards recommended by the American Bar Association in
1968.117 Like the ABA standards, the Second Circuit's rules pro-
scribed specific periods of pretrial delay and required the dis-
missal of indictments when delay was unjustified, even if the de-
fense was not impaired by the passage of time and the
defendant had never made a "demand" for a prompt trial.1
These court-enacted rules applied to offenses committed prior to
July 1975, when the Speedy Trial Act took effect.1 Over the
past two decades, the judicial rules and the Speedy Trial Act
have supplanted the sixth amendment speedy trial clause as the
principal remedy for pretrial delay in federal criminal cases. 20
The scope of a fugitive defendant's right to a speedy trial
under both the Second Circuit rules and the sixth amendment
became the subject of judicial consideration in the mid-1970s
114 See United States v. Maxwell, 383 F.2d 437, 441 n.2 (2d Cir. 1967) (defendants
waived their sixth amendment right to a speedy trial by never making a demand), cert.
denied, 389 U.S. 1043 (1968).
115 Id. at 441.
11I The Second Circuit Rules Regarding Prompt Disposition of Criminal Cases, ef-
fective July 5, 1971, were announced in United States ex rel. Frizer v. McMann, 437 F.2d
1312, 1317 (2d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 1010 (1971). The rules were
adopted pursuant to the court's supervisory authority over the administration of crimi-
nal cases and pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 332. On the history of these rules, see United
States v. Salzmann, 417 F. Supp. 1139, 1147-49 (E.D.N.Y.), afrd, 548 F.2d 395 (2d Cir.
1976).
127 For a comparison of the ABA Standards with the Second Circuit rules, see
United States v. Salzmann, 417 F. Supp. at 1147-49 (government's four-year delay in
obtaining presence of alleged draft evader living in Israel, who had not resisted govern-
ment attempts to produce him, was a failure to exercise due diligence).
118 Id. at 1148.
119 18 U.S.C. § 3161 et seq. (1985).
110 Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3165, district courts have adopted plans for disposing of
cases in accordance with the Speedy Trial Act. See, e.g., Salzmann, 417 F. Supp. at 1147
(referring to the Interim Plan of the United States District Court for the Eastern Dis-
trict of New York Under the Speedy Trial Act of 1974, adopted on September 29, 1975
(18 U.S.C. § 3161 et seq. (1985)).
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when District Judge Jack B. Weinstein decided to clear his
docket of selective service cases, some having lingered as long as
eight years. Acting on his own initiative in September 1974 fol-
lowing the President's announcement of an amnesty program for
draft evaders,121 Judge Weinstein appointed Professor Louis
Lusky of Columbia Law School to represent twenty-six unrepre-
sented fugitive defendants whose draft evasion cases were pend-
ing before him in the Eastern District of New York. 2 Professor
Lusky promptly moved to dismiss all twenty-six indictments en
masse on the ground that the defendants had all been denied
their sixth amendment right to a speedy trial.123
Invoking the language of Smith v. Hooey, Professor Lusky
argued that the government had a duty to prosecute these cases
with "due diligence" and that it had failed to proceed diligently
in two respects. First, it had not asked other governments to de-
port or extradite fugitive defendants who were known to be liv-
ing abroad. 24 Second, it had not used "all the investigative re-
sources at its command" and had not summoned the defendants'
relatives and friends before a grand jury to ascertain the wherea-
bouts of those defendants who were in hiding.125 Judge Wein-
stein denied the blanket speedy trial motion but granted leave
to renew it, finding that under Barker v. Wingo the defendants'
speedy trial claims had to be adjudicated individually.126
To facilitate individual determinations of the defendants'
speedy trial claims, Judge Weinstein directed the government to
deliver all the defendants' selective service files to Professor
Lusky.127 But the government successfully petitioned the Second
Circuit for a writ of mandamus which directed Judge Weinstein
121 On September 16, 1974, the President issued a proclamation which provided that
individuals charged with selective service violations who had not been convicted on the
charges would be relieved of prosecution and punishment if they presented themselves to
a United States Attorney before January 31, 1975, acknowledged allegiance to the United
States, and satisfactorily completed alternative nonmilitary service under the auspices of
the director of the selective service. See United States v. Lockwood, 382 F. Supp. 1111,
1113 (E.D.N.Y. 1974).
122 United States v. Salzmann, 548 F.2d 395, 398 (2d Cir. 1976). See United States v.
Weinstein, 511 F.2d 622, 624-25 (2d Cir. 1975); United States v. Lockwood, 382 F. Supp.
1111, 1112 (E.D.N.Y. 1974).
12I United States v. Lockwood, 386 F. Supp. 734 (E.D.N.Y. 1974).
124 Id. at 737.
12 Id. at 738.
124 Id. at 739.
127 Id. at 740-41.
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to vacate this discovery order.128 In United States v. Wein-
stein,129 the court of appeals found that the district judge had no
authority to order the production of the selective service files
except upon request of a party to the criminal proceedings. No
party had made such a request, since no defendant had author-
ized Professor Lusky to represent him. The Second Circuit's
opinion in Weinstein referred skeptically, if not disparagingly,
to the fugitive defendants' potential speedy trial claims. Among
other things,130 the court of appeals opined that the denial of
discovery would "not affect any defendant's constitutional right
to a speedy trial, since each is a long-time fugitive who has not
sought trial but, on the contrary, by fleeing the jurisdiction, has
prevented his case from being brought promptly to trial." 131
Afterwards, one of the twenty-six defendants, Sidney
Salzmann, authorized Professor Lusky to represent him. Profes-
sor Lusky obtained Salzmann's selective service file and then
moved on his behalf to dismiss the indictment on speedy trial
grounds. The facts disclosed in his motion revealed that
Salzmann's case differed markedly from the paradigmatic draft
evasion case envisioned by the Second Circuit when it granted
the government's mandamus petition.1 32 Salzmann had not fled
the country to avoid being brought to trial. A former rabbinical
I United States v. Weinstein, 511 F.2d 622 (2d Cir). cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1042
(1975).
292 Id.
130 In its discussion of the facts of the case, the court implied that it was paradoxical
to bring a speedy trial claim on behalf of a fugitive defendant- it noted that Profezsor
Lusky planned to assert these claims "even though prompt trials had been rendered
impossible by thb defendants having fled the jurisdiction and their never having sought a
trial." Id. at 626. Thereafter, the court placed the blame for pretrial delay squarely on
the defendants: it determined that because "the delay here is attributable to defendants'
flight," discovery of the selective service fies was not warranted by FED. R. Ciu?. P.
48(a), which authorizes a district court to dismiss an indictment on its own motion "if
there is unnecessary delay in bringing a defendant to trial." Id. at 627-28. The court
further found that the appointment of an attorney to represent a fugitive defendant
without his consent or authorization was unsupported by "usage or custom" and, indeed,
was contrary to "controlling precedent" which established that "[t]he flight of a defend-
ant for the purpose of avoiding prosecution or punishment 'disentitles [him] to call upon
the resources of the Court for determination of his claims."' Id. at 628 (quoting Moli-
naro v. New Jersey, 396 U.S. 365, 366 (1970)). And the court concluded by observing that
"[t]he administration of justice is not served by the court's unilateral effort to activate
the defense of a criminal case in which prosecution has been frustrated by the defend-
ant's flight from the jurisdiction." Id.
231 Id. at 626.
In See note 130 supra.
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student, Salzmann was already residing in Israel when he was
directed to report for a preinduction physical examination in
late 1970 and then for induction in early 1971. He promptly
wrote to his draft board and told it that he could not afford to
return to the United States and that he hoped to be permitted
to make his permanent home in Israel and to serve in the Israeli
Defense Forces.
Salzmann's letters implied that he would return to this
country if his way were paid, but the draft board did not re-
spond to Salzmann's correspondence. Instead, when he failed to
report for induction, the draft board referred his case to the
United States Attorney, who secured a two-count indictment for
violating the Selective Service Act. Upon learning of the indict-
ment, Salzmann wrote to the prosecutor that he was financially
unable to return to answer the charges. He also explained that it
was never his intention to evade military service, but that it was
his life's goal to resettle in Israel.1 3 The prosecution, however,
made no offer to finance Salzmann's return to the United States,
nor did it undertake any other effort to secure his presence at
trial.
Judge Weinstein held that under these circumstances
Salzmann had been deprived of his speedy trial rights under a
variety of provisions, including the speedy trial clause of the
sixth amendment. However, Judge Weinstein relied principally
on the Second Circuit's speedy trial rules,134 which generally re-
quired a criminal trial to commence within six months of indict-
ment.13 5 He acknowledged that the Second Circuit rules did not
count periods of delay caused by the defendant's unavailabil-
ity,"36 which was defined to include periods when the defend-
ant's "location is known but his presence for trial cannot be ob-
tained by due diligence.' 1 37 But he found that this exception did
"1 417 F. Supp. at 1144-45.
13 Id. at 1151-64.
135 2d Cir. Rules Regarding the Prompt Disposition of Criminal Cases, Rule 4.
136 Id.
13 Id. Rule 5(d). Rule 5(d) provided that in computing the time within which the
government should be ready for trial, the following period should be excluded:
(d) The period of delay resulting from the absence or unavailability of the
defendant. A defendant should be considered absent whenever his location is
unknown and in addition he is attempting to avoid apprehension or prosecu-
tion or his location cannot be determined by due diligence. A defendant should
be considered unavailable whenever his location is known but his presence for
[Vol. 56: 439
FUGITIVE DEFENDANTS
not apply, because Salzmann's presence might have been ob-
tained if the government had simply offered to pay for his travel
to this country, as it routinely did for subpoenaed witnesses liv-
ing abroad and as it had begun to do for overseas draftees: 38
The phrase "due diligence," if it is to have any meaningful con-
tent must at the very least embody the responsibility of the govern-
ment to read its mail and respond intelligently. If the government has
at its disposal a means of procuring a defendant's presence with a
minimum expenditure of effort, and here the effort may only have en-
tailed informing the defendant of an existing government program of
travel assistance, then due diligence must require the government to
make this effort. The government cannot complain of the defendant's
continued unavailability when the government chooses not to employ
means readily at its disposal to procure his presence.""
Although Judge Weinstein saw Salzmann's case as "part of
a pattern," whereby the government had refused to make any
serious effort to locate and apprehend fugitive defendants in se-
lective service cases or to request their extradition by foreign na-
tions,1 40 he rested his decision on a narrow principle of seem-
ingly limited applicability. At the heart of Judge Weinstein's
decision was the recognition that Salzmann was not a fugitive in
the traditional sense. He had never attempted to avoid prosecu-
tion.141 Consequently, Judge Weinstein analogized to state court
cases which held the prosecution accountable for pretrial delay
"when the accused was 'unavailable' only because of the negli-
gence of authorities in failing to pursue him, and not because of
trial cannot be obtained by due diligence.
Rule 5(d) departed from the ABA standard on which it was modeled in one signifi-
cant respect- The ABA standard provided that "A defendant should be considered un-
available whenever his whereabouts are known but his presence for trial cannot be ob-
tained or whenever the defendant resists being returned to the state for trial." Standards
Relating to the Administration of Criminal Justice, 2d Edition, Tent. Draft Approved
(1979) American Bar Association § 12-2.3(e).
The counterpart provision of the Speedy Trial Act is patterned on the ABA stan-
dard. It provides that "a defendant... shall be considered absent when his wherea-
bouts are unknown, and in addition, he is attempting to avoid apprehension or prosecu-
tion or his whereabouts cannot be determined by due diligence," and "a defendant...
shall be considered unavailable whenever his whereabouts are known but his presence
for trial cannot be obtained by due diligence or he resists appearing at or being re-
turned for trial." 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(3)(B) (1985).
"I United States v. Salzmann, 417 F. Supp. at 1155.
119 Id.
140 Id. at 1156-61.
141 Id. at 1165.
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any deliberate evasion on the part of the accused."142 And he
characterized the duty of "due diligence" narrowly under such
circumstances: "to inform a defendant claiming lack of sufficient
funds to travel to the place of trial, that the United States will
advance his costs of transportation. ' '14
Judge Weinstein also found that Salzmann had been de-
prived of his sixth amendment right to a speedy trial.144 Ad-
dressing the four factors identified by the Supreme Court in
Barker v. Wingo, he first found that the four-year delay follow-
ing Salzmann's indictment was substantial, then turned to the
reasons for the delay. Significantly, he did not believe that the
government's nonfeasance absolved Salzmann of an obligation to
make himself available for trial. On the contrary, Judge Wein-
stein found that "Salzmann and the government shared respon-
sibility" for the delay-Salzmann because he never made a seri-
ous effort to return to the United States, and the government
because it never offered him transportation to the United States
to stand trial.4 5 Next, Judge Weinstein found that Salzmann's
failure to assert his speedy trial rights did "not weigh heavily
against him," because, as an unrepresented defendant, he had
probably been "unaware of his right to a speedy trial or of the
consequences of his failure to demand a trial promptly." 4 6 Fi-
nally, he found that, although Salzmann had not been incarcer-
ated before trial, and had not shown that the delay affected his
ability to defend himself, he had been prejudiced by the anxiety
of living under indictment.4 7
The court of appeals affirmed Judge Weinstein's dismissal
of the indictment only on the basis of the Second Circuit rules,
expressly declining to decide the remaining issues raised by the
142 Id. at 1156 (citing People v. Serio, 13 Misc. 2d 973, 181 N.Y.S.2d 340 (Erie
County Ct. 1958)).
143 Id.
14 Id. at 1165-71.
14 Id. at 1165-66.
"I Id. at 1167-68.
" Id. at 1168. Few courts have considered the anxiety created by pretrial delay to
be enough, standing alone, to establish "prejudice"; more typically, a defendant must
show some way in which his ability to defend against the government's charges has been
impaired. See, e.g., United States v. Wehling, 676 F.2d 1053, 1059 (5th Cir.) (pre-indict-
ment delay of six years did not create an automatic presumption of prejudice), reh'g
denied, 683 F.2d 1373 (5th Cir. 1982) . See also United States v. Hill, 622 F.2d 900, 910
(5th Cir. 1980) (anxiety inherent in any delay is insufficient to establish prejudice).
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district court's decision. 148 The panel's decision was made easier
because the government had ultimately softened its legal posi-
tion almost to the point of throwing in the towel. In the district
court, the government had lumped Salzmann together with the
fugitive draft evaders and argued that "a fugitive defendant may
[not] assert a claim that he has been deprived of his right to a
speedy trial."1 49 On appeal, however, the government recognized
that Salzmann may not have been trying to avoid prosecution,
but may have been more like the defendants in cases such as
Smith v. Hooeyi50 and Dickey v. Florida"' who were not able to
appear in court without government assistance. Thus, the gov-
ernment conceded that under the Second Circuit's speedy trial
rules, its failure to offer Salzmann travel funds would have con-
stituted a lack of "due diligence" if Salzmann were, in fact, im-
pecunious. 52 The government argued simply that Salzmann's
claims may not have been sincere, and it therefore asked the
court of appeals to remand the case for a hearing concerning
Salzmann's financial status.
The government's request was rejected in an opinion au-
thored by Chief Judge Irving R. Kaufman, who had previously
been a member of the panel that issued the writ of mandamus in
Weinstein. The court determined that a remand was inappropri-
ate in light of the government's concession: if Salzmann's good
faith were in question, the government should have tested it af-
ter his indictment by offering to pay his way back to the United
States.153 Implicit in the government's duty of due diligence was
a responsibility to take cost-free steps "to clarify an ambiguous
situation," thereby obviating the later need for a "necessarily
speculative post hoc hearing. '154
While acknowledging that there was no need to do so, Chief
Judge Kaufman concluded by briefly addressing the govern-
148 United States v. Salzmann, 548 F.2d at 399.
140 Letter of Assistant United States Attorney Thomas Maher (Jan. 16, 1975),
quoted in United States v. Salzmann, 417 F. Supp. at 1155-56. See also Letter of Assis-
tant United States Attorney Thomas Maher (June 10, 1976), quoted in United States v.
Salzmann, 417 F. Supp. at 1168 ("where [a] defendant was aware of the pending indict-
ment, his decision to avoid trial constitutes a waiver of his right to a speedy trial").
21" 393 U.S. 374 (1969).
151 398 U.S. 30 (1970).
'5' Salzmann, 548 F.2d at 399.
25 Id.
"1 Id. at 401.
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ment's failure to seek the extradition or deportation of selective
service offenders.155 He opined that "[w]here the American right
to demand extradition is established by treaty, considerations of
foreign policy might well be subordinated to speedy trial," but
that the result might be different when an extradition treaty did
not apply.156 "[A] considered refusal" to seek extradition as a
matter of comity would not necessarily be inconsistent with
"due diligence," he found, and judicial review of the govern-
ment's decision not to seek extradition would be "drastically
limit[ed]" by the courts' "traditional deference to the judgment
of the executive branch in matters of foreign policy. 1 57
Judge Wilfred Feinberg, who also had been on the panel in
Weinstein, wrote separately to criticize the government's failure
to seek Salzmann's extradition, which he believed in itself
demonstrated a lack of "due diligence" under the Second Cir-
cuit's speedy trial rules.""" Judge Feinberg's conclusion was pre-
mised on his view that Salzmann was not really a fugitive, but
just an absent defendant who had always made his residence
known to the government.15 9 In language quoted at the outset of
this Article, Judge Feinberg stressed that a "true fugitive" could
not successfully assert a speedy trial claim, because permitting
him to do so "would be [to] sanction[] the playing of games by
fugitives."160 But, in Salzmann's case, the prosecution should at
least have asked the State Department to request Israel's coop-
eration in obtaining Salzmann's return.""1 And even this might
not have been enough. If the State Department made a foreign
policy decision not to seek Salzmann's return, its "considered
choice of inaction" might not insulate the government under the
Second Circuit rules. 62
One of the most striking aspects of Salzmann is the dis-
'55 Id. at 402.
156 Id.
'8 Id. at 402-03.
'" Id. at 403-05 (Feinberg, J., concurring).
Id. at 403-04 & n.2 (Feinberg, J., concurring).
" Id. at 404 (Feinberg, J., concurring). Judge Feinberg's idea of a "true fugitive"
seems narrower than the commonly held view, which would include any defendant who
acts to avoid arrest. See note 1 supra. Judge Feinberg's definition, while including those
who conceal their whereabouts to avoid arrest, would apparently not include those who,
to avoid arrest, leave the country but then do not hide their whereabouts abroad.
261 Id.
..2 Id. at 404-05 & n.7.
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tance between its grasp and its reach. What the case held, for all
three judges who issued an opinion, was carefully tailored to ad-
dress that, perhaps alone among the defendants whose draft
evasion cases were pending in the district court, Salzmann ap-
peared ready and willing to answer the charges but unable to do
so. At the same time, however, these judges reached far beyond
this unusual case, hoping to influence the disposition of the re-
maining selective service cases in which the defendants were
"real fugitives" who had evaded not only the draft, but prosecu-
tion as well. The judges' temptation to reach is easily under-
stood. By the mid-1960s, the selective service defendants were
regarded by many not as "real criminals" but, in some sense, as
victims of an unpopular war. The executive branch, by its initial
decision not to extradite fugitive draft evaders, and by its subse-
quent proclamation of amnesty, seemed to be looking for a com-
promise whereby the defendants' conduct would be neither con-
doned nor punished. By fashioning a legal basis for dismissing
the cases still pending after the war ended, these judges must
have believed that they were promoting the conciliatory goals of
the executive branch.
Less clear is whether the solicitude of the Salzmann judges
was meant to extend beyond the selective service defendants, or
whether, instead, in cases involving "real fugitives" accused of
"real crimes," they would be more skeptical. 63 For more than a
,63 In United States v. Estremera, 531 F.2d 1103, 1107-08 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 425
U.S. 979 (1976), a case decided shortly before Salzmann, a panel of the Second Circuit
was far less solicitous in applying the court-adopted speedy trial rules to a fugitive de-
fendant. Defendant Estremera participated with three others in a Bronx bank robbery in
February 1973, then became a fugitive six days later upon learning that one of his ac-
complices had been arrested. He was indicted the next month but did not appear at
arraignment and the government did not discover his whereabouts until January 1974
when it was notified that Estremera had been arrested in Canada for auto theft. The
government initially did not request his extradition because proceedings were brought in
Canada to deport him, but an extradition request was made in October 1974, after Es-
tremera successfully challenged his deportation order. Following his extradition, the dis-
trict court rejected Estremera's challenge under speedy trial rules which had been
adopted by the Southern District of New York, and the court of appeals affirmed. Es-
tremera conceded that the government could not be charged for the delay when he was a
fugitive prior to his arrest in Canada, but argued that afterwards the government did not
make a diligent effort to secure his presence because it did not immediately request his
extradition. The court of appeals disagreed, finding that the government had reasonably
believed that Estremera was deportable and therefore relied on a procedure that would
ordinarily have been quicker and simpler than extradition. The panel concluded:
To permit appellant, who used every tactic at his command to remain outside
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decade this question could not be answered, if only because, as
one surmises from its reported decisions, the Second Circuit
considered no case in which a fugitive defendant brought a
speedy trial claim based on Salzmann. e6 As time passed,
Salzmann might have increasingly appeared to be a judicial arti-
fact - an interpretation of court-crafted speedy trial rules
which no longer applied, in the context of draft evasion cases
which, in an era of the volunteer army, were no longer prose-
cuted.165 But as it turned out, Salzmann was to leave its imprint
on the Second Circuit's view of the sixth amendment after all.
the United States in order to prevent a speedy trial, to benefit from the gov-
ernment's mistaken reliance upon deportation procedures in lieu of initiating
extradition proceedings, would be to pervert the [speedy trial rules] by re-
warding a defendant for his own obstruction of a speedy trial.
531 F.2d at 1108.
Similarly, in United States v. Schreiber, 535 F. Supp. 1359 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), the de-
fendant was indicted on fraud charges in March 1966, at a time when he was living in
England. He learned of the indictment the following month but made no effort to return
to answer the charges. Although the government learned of his whereabouts, it did not
seek his extradition because it believed that Schreiber was not subject to extradition
under this country's treaty with England. The government advised immigration authori-
ties to arrest him if he entered the country and, around ten years later, apprised the
American embassy in London of Schreiber's status. In 1981, after the embassy refused to
renew his passport, Schreiber moved through counsel to dismiss the indictment on
speedy trial grounds. Finding that Schreiber's testimony was needed to resolve disputed
facts, District Judge Carter denied the motion without prejudice to its being renewed if
Schreiber returned, which he then did. Following a hearing, Judge Carter denied the
motion, finding both that the government had exercised "due diligence" to obtain
Schreiber's presence, id. at 1364, and that "[t]he speedy trial requirements should not
operate to reward a recalcitrant and reluctant defendant" such as Schreiber. Id. at 1363.
164 The court did, however, consider the sufficiency of the government's efforts to
locate an absent defendant who was not a fugitive. See United States v. Rodriguez-
Restrepo, 680 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1982) (government made "considerable efforts" to locate
absent defendant who was unaware of pending charges).
165 Salzmann appears to have had little impact prior to the 1988 decision in
Diacolios. Salzmann was not cited in any reported Second Circuit opinion regarding a
defendant's right to a speedy trial, and insofar as it was noticed by courts outside the
Second Circuit, it was generally cited only in passing. See, e.g., United States v. Deleon,
710 F.2d 1218, 1222 n.4 (7th Cir. 1983); United States v. Steinberg, 478 F. Supp. 29, 32
(N.D. Ill. 1979). Moreover, one court explicitly rejected the Second Circuit's suggestion
that there might be a duty to pursue fugitive defendants, finding that such a duty would
be at odds with the "well-established" rule that a fugitive defendant waives the right to a
speedy trial. United States v. Judge, 425 F. Supp. 499, 502 (D. Mass. 1976).
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IV. THE DECISION IN UNTD STATES V. DmcoLmos
A. Factual Background
In February 1984, a magistrate in the Southern District of
New York issued a warrant for the arrest of Michael Diacolios
for conspiring to defraud the government. According to the gov-
ernment's complaint, Diacolios and his brother, owners of a res-
taurant in northern Manhattan, filed federal and state income
tax returns seeking refunds in the names of fictitious employees,
then used the checks they received to buy food for their
restaurant. 66
Diacolios was not arrested on the warrant, for, as the gov-
ernment later discovered, he had returned to his native Greece.
In late June, a five-count indictment was filed. Diacolios did not
appear at arraignment the next month, but retained an attorney,
Felix Gilroy, who entered a plea of not guilty on his behalf. In
the months that followed, Gilroy filed motions and continued to
appear for Diacolios before District Judge Abraham Sofaer, to
whom the case was originally assigned. 67
Both the district court and the prosecution gave thought to
whether Diacolios could be brought back to the United States to
be tried on the indictment. During a conference in August, in
response to a suggestion that Diacolios was without funds, Judge
Sofaer asked defense attorney Gilroy to ascertain whether his
client would return if the government paid his way. The judge
offered to try Diacolios immediately if he returned the following
month, but Diacolios did not take the court up on its offer.1"" In
March 1985, the prosecutor advised the court that Diacolios ap-
parently was not subject to extradition from Greece. Defense at-
torney Gilroy asked that Diacolios be tried in absentia, but the
court denied the motion, finding that Diacolios could not law-
fully be tried unless he was present.16 9
, United States v. Diacolios, 837 F.2d 79, 80 (2d Cir. 1988).
267 Id. at 80-81.
"I Id. at 81; Joint Appendix at 126-30, United States v. Diacolics, 837 F.2d 79 (2d
Cir. 1988) (No. 87-1320) [hereinafter Diacolios App.].
,1" Diacolios, 837 F.2d at 81. The district court denied Diacolios's motion to be tried
in absentia because Diacolios had never appeared in court to answer the charges against
him. Under Second Circuit case law, a defendant cannot be tried in absentia unless the
trial court is certain that he has been put on notice of the proceedings begun against
him, and a court can be certain of that fact only after the defendant has appeared in
open court to answer the indictment. See United States v. Tortora, 464 F.2d 1202, 1209
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The constitutional implications of Diacolios's fugitive status
also received some consideration from Judge Sofaer. At one
point in the course of a pretrial conference, defense counsel re-
ferred to the Salzmann case. Although the decision in Salzmann
was based on Second Circuit rules no longer in effect, Judge
Sofaer took the comment to be an oral motion to dismiss the
indictment on speedy trial grounds. The district judge denied
the motion out of hand, deriding it as "nonsense," while noting,
"It's okay with me if the Second Circuit wants to accept [it]."'170
Diacolios's speedy trial claim would not have to await the
appellate court to receive a warmer reception, however. In June
1985, after Judge Sofaer left the bench to join the U.S. Depart-
ment of State, the case was reassigned to District Judge Charles
S. Haight. In February 1986, Gilroy asked Judge Haight to dis-
miss the indictment under the speedy trial clause because of the
government's purported failure to exercise "due diligence" to
bring his client to trial. 71 Gilroy's principal argument, and the
only one that Judge Haight took seriously, was that the govern-
ment had a duty to seek diligently Diacolios's forcible return
from Greece."7 ' Although, as a Greek national, Diacolios was not
subject to extradition by treaty,173 Gilroy argued that the gov-
ernment should nevertheless have engaged in diplomatic negoti-
ations to secure Diacolios's return. 7 4
B. The District Court's Decision
Initially, Judge Haight analyzed Diacolios's claim under the
four-factor balancing test of Barker v. Wingo.17 5 In a prelimi-
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1063 (1972).
170 Diacolios App., supra note 168, at 59.
1 Diacolios, 837 F.2d at 81; Diacolios App., supra note 168, at 62, 64.
172 United States v. Diacolios, No. 84 Cr. 436-CSH, slip op. at 11 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 9,
1986). The court flatly rejected Diacolios's alternative argument that the government
failed to offer him financial assistance so that he could return from Greece to answer the
charges. It found that, on the contrary, the government had expressed its willingness to
finance his return if he needed financial assistance, but that Diacolios had not taken the
government up on its offer. Id. at 5-11.
173 The extradition treaty between the United States and Greece provided that
neither country "shall be bound to deliver up its own citizens." Extradition Treaty, Nov.
1, 1932, United States-Greece, art. VIII, 47 Stat. 2185, 2191, T.S. No. 855, quoted in
United States v. Diacolios, 837 F.2d at 81.
1 See United States v. Diacolios, No. 84 Cr. 436-CSH, slip op. at 11 (S.D.N.Y.
Sept. 9, 1986).
175 407 U.S. 514 (1972).
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nary opinion, he found that, although the length of pretrial de-
lay was "presumptively prejudicial," two factors weighed against
the claim: Diacolios did not promptly seek a speedy trial, but
allowed twenty months to pass after indictment before filing his
speedy trial motion. In addition, Diacolios failed to show that he
had been prejudiced by the delay.""6
Judge Haight then considered the remaining factor, "the
reason for the delay." As a preliminary matter, what Judge
Sofaer had dismissed as "nonsense," Judge Haight found to be
"beyond cavil": "that the Government has a 'constitutional duty
to make a diligent good faith effort' to bring the defendant
before the court for trial."17' 7 He undertook no analysis in sup-
port of the proposition that the duty to seek diligently a defend-
ant's presence at trial applies in the case of a fugitive defendant.
He merely cited the Supreme Court's decision in Smith v.
Hooey,717 together with a Seventh Circuit decision, United
States v. Deleon,'79 which had recognized that the duty applied
when the defendant was unaware of the pending charges, and
thus, like the incarcerated defendant in Smith, was unable to
appear on his own.19°
Judge Haight also took it as a given that the due diligence
standard under the sixth amendment was coextensive with the
standard enunciated in Salzmann a decade earlier with respect
to the Second Circuit's then-existing speedy trial rules. He inter-
preted Salzmann to require that, under the due diligence stan-
dard, when a fugitive defendant residing abroad is not subject to
extradition pursuant to treaty, the government must either re-
quest the defendant's surrender as an act of comity or make a
"policy decision" not to do so. 18 Judge Haight found the record
inadequate, however, to ascertain whether such a policy decision
had been made. For this reason, he called for the government
"to submit affidavits . . . setting forth in detail the facts sur-
176 United States v. Diacolios, No. 84 Cr. 436-CSH, slip op. at 3-4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 9,
1986).
177 Id. at 4-5.
178 393 U.S. 374 (1969).
179 710 F.2d 1218 (7th Cir. 1983).
'60 Id. at 1223 (accepting as true Deleon's allegation that he "was totally unaware of
any charges pending against him until his arrest").




rounding any and all policy decisions made by the Government
not to request Greece to surrender Diacolios despite his status as
unextraditable.'' 1 8 2
Based on affidavits later submitted by the government,
Judge Haight ultimately issued an opinion dismissing the indict-
ment because of what he perceived to be the government's fail-
ure to exercise due diligence in seeking Diacolios's return for
trial.183 His opinion acknowledged that since at least 1953 the
State Department's general policy was not to request surrender
as an act of comity, but found "the record . ..devoid of any
indication that the Government consciously decided to apply the
'general' rule in this case."'" 4 In response to the government's
unchallenged representation that no European country permit-
ted extradition of its nationals as a matter of comity, Judge
Haight agreed that the government is not required to do "that
which is futile," but found that an extradition request would not
necessarily have been futile in this case. 8" Parsing the govern-
ment's affidavits exceedingly finely, Judge Haight found that the
government had established only that extradition was unavaila-
ble in 1986 when it filed its affidavits, and not in 1984 when
Diacolios was indicted."'8 Accordingly, Judge Haight found that
the prosecution's failure to request Diacolios's surrender was not
the product of choice, but of inertia.
Unlike the district court opinion in Salzmann, where Judge
Weinstein found that the defendant "shared responsibility" for
the pretrial delay, Judge Haight apparently thought the govern-
ment bore exclusive responsibility for the failure to bring
Diacolios to trial. Despite his earlier recognition that Diacolios
had refused to return to this country on his own and had
spurned the chance to have his return financed by the govern-
ment, Judge Haight now made no mention of Diacolios's own
complicity in delaying the trial. Indeed, in contrast to
Salzmann, the defendant unquestionably was able to appear for
trial if he chose to do so. Also conspicuously absent from Judge
Haight's final opinion was any reference to Barker's balancing
162 Id. at 13-14.
183 United States v. Diacolios, No. 84 Cr. 436-CSH, slip op. at 1-2 (S.D.N.Y. June 17,
1987), rev'd, 837 F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 1988).
1"4 Id. at 2.




test. Although he earlier had found that two factors-Diacolios's
belated assertion of the speedy trial right and the absence of
prejudice to the defense-weighed against the claim, Judge
Haight made no effort to explain why the government's failure
to make a "policy decision" not to extradite Diacolios now suf-
ficed to tip the scales the other way. This too contrasted with
Salzmann, where Judge Weinstein found that pretrial delay was
constitutionally impermissible because all the Barker factors ei-
ther weighed against the government or carried no weight. Thus,
Judge Haight seemed to have replaced Barker's balancing test
with an inelastic rule: a fugitive defendant's right to a speedy
trial is violated whenever there is an appreciable period during
which the government fails diligently to seek his presence at
trial.
C. The Government's Arguments on Appeal
The government's position on appeal contrasted sharply
with the half-hearted stance it had adopted in Salzmann years
earlier. The government forcefully contended in Diacolios that
Judge Haight was wrong to blame the government for failing to
secure the defendant's appearance at trial. Its principal assertion
was that, as a matter of law, any delay "caused by [a defend-
ant's] own voluntary decision to become and remain a fugitive
cannot be charged to the Government."' 87 While acknowledging
that decisions such as Smith v. Hooey established "a duty to
make a diligent effort to locate and secure the presence of a
criminal defendant who cannot appear of his own volition be-
cause he is imprisoned,. .. because he is unaware of the pend-
ing charges, . . . or because he lacks financial resources," the
government argued that it had no duty to "take steps to compel
the appearance of a defendant who is able to appear in court
voluntarily but refuses to do so." 188
The government also presented two alternative arguments.
First, it asserted that even if there were a duty to seek the extra-
dition of a fugitive defendant who was at liberty in a foreign
country, that duty existed only when the defendant was subject
to extradition by treaty; in a case such as Diacolios, where the
187 Brief for Appellant at 16, United States v. Diacolios, 837 F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 1988)
(No. 87-1320).
163 Id. at 17-18.
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established mechanism for extradition did not apply to the par-
ticular defendant, the judiciary was not entitled to inquire into
the adequacy of the executive's reasons for declining to seek the
defendant's extradition as an act of comity." 9 Second, the gov-
ernment contended that even if there were generally an obliga-
tion either to seek a fugitive defendant's extradition outside the
relevant treaty or to show a valid reason for not doing so, the
government had met that obligation by showing valid reasons
for not requesting Diacolios's extradition: To begin with, such a
request would have been futile, and the government should not
have to take futile measures. Moreover, for at least a quarter of
a century, the State Department's general policy was not to re-
quest extradition as a matter of comity. Even if such request
might have been granted, the government was entitled to follow
its policy "and was not obliged, as a matter of 'due diligence,' to
consider whether to make an exception in Diacolios's particular
case.
,,19o
D. The Second Circuit's Decision
The Second Circuit's decision in United States v.
Diacolios'9' was less than exhaustive. Circuit Judge Frank X. Al-
timari penned the opinion for a panel which included Circuit
Judge Amalya Kearse and District Judge Morris E. Lasker.
Judge Altimari's opinion described the factual background of
the case in approximately two pages,192 then dispatched the legal
issues in roughly the same length." 3
Judge Altimari did not acknowledge the government's prin-
cipal argument, that the fugitive defendant is wholly to blame
for any pretrial delay during the period when he is absent from
the jurisdiction. Instead, the court took it as a given that the
government would be responsible for the delay unless it made a
satisfactory effort to apprehend the defendant. 9 4 In the opening
paragraph of his legal discussion, Judge Altimari wrote simply:
As the district court recognized, the issue to be decided in the instant
"' Id. at 21.
"' Id. at 22.
837 F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 1988).
192 Id. at 80-82.
193 Id. at 82-84.
'9' Id. at 82.
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case is whether the government satisfied its "constitutional duty to
make a diligent good faith effort" to bring Diacolios to trial without
unnecessary delay. See Smith u. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374, 383 (1969).10-
Thus, the Second Circuit became the first court of appeals to
expressly hold that the government had a duty under the sixth
amendment to pursue a fugitive defendant. The court of appeals
relied on the lower court opinion, which itself had contained no
reasoning and only inapposite citations.""6 In addition, the court
cited to Smith v. Hooey, implying that the duty to make a dili-
gent effort to bring a fugitive defendant to trial followed directly
from the Supreme Court's decision in that case. Yet, Smith only
established a prosecutor's duty to make an effort to obtain the
presence of an incarcerated defendant who had insisted upon
being tried promptly, but could not appear in court on his own.
It surely does not follow-much less follow directly-that prose-
cutors have a duty to seek the presence of a defendant who is at
liberty and willfully evading prosecution."9
The Diacolios panel reserved the remainder of its discussion
for an "examin[ation of] the government's duty to exercise due
diligence in a situation where, as in this case, the defendant is a
fugitive residing in a foreign country, and no right of extradition
exists under the treaty with that country to secure his re-
turn."198 In interpreting the scope of the prosecutor's duty of
due diligence, the court parted company with the district judge.
It observed that, at least since 1953, this country has had a pol-
icy of not asking European countries to extradite individuals "as
an act of comity," outside the applicable extradition treaty.' 9
This policy, in the court's view, is a "considered" one.2 00 The
reason behind it is simple: Like the United States, European
countries do not permit extradition as an act of comity, so any
such request would be futile."'
195 Id.
1" See notes 177-80 and accompanying text supra.
7 See, e.g., United States v. Steinberg, 478 F. Supp. 29, 32 (N.D. IML 1979) (unlike
defendant who was incarcerated abroad, defendant who took asylum in Rhodesia could
not complain of seven-year delay in bringing him to trial).
198 Diacolios, 837 F.2d at 82.
19 Id. at 83.
:00 Id.
1o Id. As the court noted, this country's unwillingness to honor similar requests




Unlike Judge Haight, the court did not believe that in every
case the prosecution has a duty to decide whether to depart
from the government's general policy. All the prosecution has to
do is to ascertain that the policy applies to the particular
defendant:
While it is true that United States policy does not "preclude requests
for surrender not based on the extradition treaty,". . . we think that
compelling the government to consider making such an exception in
every case would vitiate the policy and render meaningless "our tradi-
tional deference to the judgment of the executive department in mat-
ters of foreign policy.". . . Indeed, we are aware of no case that holds
that a formal request for extradition must be made before due dili-
gence can be found to have existed .... Due diligence surely does
not require the government to pursue that which is futile ....
Given the deference we must give to a coordinate branch of gov-
ernment, particularly the executive branch in matters of foreign pol-
icy, we therefore hold that the speedy trial clause does not prevent the
government from adhering to its general policy not to seek extradition
as a matter of comity.
20
In a case such as Diacolios, in which the defendant is known to
be residing abroad and therefore beyond this country's judicial
process, the executive is entitled to rely on its general policy not
to seek extradition as a matter of "comity." Except in the un-
likely event that the State Department someday abandons its
longstanding policy, no extradition requests need be made where
the extradition treaty is inapplicable. 0 3
202 Id. at 83-84 (citations omitted).
203 While finding that the government had acted with due diligence, notwithstand-
ing its failure to seek the defendant's extradition, the panel seemed to take an expansive
view of "due diligence" in cases where the defendant was known to be residing abroad.
Id. For example, in specifying that the prosecutor's duty to pursue fugitive defendants
will accommodate legitimate foreign policy considerations, the decision seemed to sug-
gest that other considerations, such as an interest in conserving investigative resources,
would not justify inaction. The panel also left open the possibility that even some foreign
policy decisions would be considered inadequate to justify a refusal to seek the defend-
ant's extradition. Its view seemed to be that, as a matter of due diligence, the govern-
ment is obliged to seek the extradition of all those defendants who are subject to extradi-
tion under a treaty, and its opinion seemed carefully phrased to avoid any assurance
that, out of deference to the executive's judgment in matters of foreign policy, the court
would uphold a "considered refusal" to seek extradition where a treaty did apply. Id.
The court thus left open the possibility that a prosecutor's duty under the sixth amend-
ment would override the executive's discretion in such cases.
As a consequence, even though Diacolios established that a considered refusal to
seek a defendant's extradition would generally be upheld, the decision was not especially
deferential to the executive's foreign affairs authority. On the contrary, in certain re-
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Given that the Diacolios panel ultimately ruled against the
defendant, it is striking that the court would reach so far as to
announce a prosecutorial duty to pursue fugitive defendants
with due diligence. The court was certainly not compelled to de-
cide whether or not such a duty existed. It might have stated,
more cautiously, that there is no need to consider whether pros-
ecutors must pursue fugitives with due diligence because, assum-
ing for argument's sake that there is such an obligation, it was
met in Diacolios's case. Such a cautious approach would have
been consistent with the traditional judicial reluctance to decide
constitutional questions which have no impact on the outcome
of a case.20' On the other hand, because the government pre-
vailed in Diacolios, the court could interpret the speedy trial
clause without risking reversal by the Supreme Court. The court
might have hoped that by the time the Supreme Court could
spects Diacolios significantly trenches on executive discretion. The State Department
must now be cognizant that if it declines to seek extradition on the basis of considera-
tions of foreign policy, its decision may later be scrutinized by a court which will require
public disclosure of the government's reasoning. The possibility of public disclosure will
influence the State Department's decision making in cases where it is legitimately reluc-
tant to expose the reasoning behind its refusal to request extradition. Moreover, even
before the State Department is ever called on to justify its decision, a refusal to seek a
defendant's extradition will now be invested with a meaning which it might not previ-
ously have had; the decision will presumptively reflect a foreign policy judgment, and not
simply a determination about the appropriate allocation of resources.
The Salzmann case can be used to illustrate the potential impact of the Second
Circuit's new rule. Suppose that during the Vietnam War the government had made a
considered decision not to extradite draft evaders. That decision may have reflected a
judgment that this country's standing in the world community would be diminished by
efforts to extradite draft evaders, in part because this country would appear to lack com-
passion, and in part because such efforts would engender conflict with countries which
harbored American draft evaders out of opposition to this country's involvement in Viet-
nam. Suppose, further, that the government had determined that it could not publicly
acknowledge its extradition policy, because to do so might (a) encourage an increase in
draft evasion; and (b) lead to resentment or hostility from supporters of this country's
military involvement and thereby engender additional domestic strife. Prior to Diacolios,
the government could avoid officially acknowledging a policy like the one which it appar-
ently had pursued during the Vietnam War. After Diacolios, it could not do so. As a
consequence of Diacolios, the government might conclude that, despite legitimate coun-
tervailing foreign policy concerns, it should seek the extradition of draft evaders rather
than risk the disclosure of its reasons for not doing so. One might easily doubt whether
this encroachment on executive decision making is adequately justified by the benefits
which would accrue to fugitive defendants themselves, who would be provided a speedy,
albeit unwanted, trial
204 See generally Rescue Army v. Municipal Court of Los Angeles, 331 U.S. 549




address the question, the prosecutorial duty to pursue fugitive
defendants would be accepted by appellate courts outside the
Second Circuit. 0 5 What the Diacolios panel undoubtedly did
not anticipate, however, was that its opinion would be treated
roughly by future panels of the Second Circuit itself.
V. THE SECOND CIRCUIT'S UNJUSTIFIED REJECTION OF PRIOR
PRECEDENT
Until recently, courts had invoked either of two legal princi-
ples to justify categorically rejecting speedy trial claims brought
by fugitive defendants: that a fugitive defendant waives the
right to a speedy trial and that a fugitive defendant is solely
responsible for pretrial delay during the period of his flight. In
Diacolios, however, the Second Circuit tacitly abandoned these
legal principles in favor of an expansive interpretation of the
speedy trial clause. It held that a fugitive defendant may seek
relief for pretrial delay. Moreover, the defendant may hold the
prosecution partially responsible for that delay if the prosecu-
tion did not diligently attempt to apprehend him. The effect of
the Second Circuit's ruling is to make the constitutional right to
a speedy trial more extensive than the federal Speedy Trial Act
and similar state legislation. Legislative enactments uniformly
deny protection to fugitive defendants whose whereabouts are
unknown without regard to whether the prosecution has at-
tempted to apprehend them. In contrast, the Second Circuit re-
quires the prosecution to pursue not only those fugitive defend-
ants who are known to be residing in a particular spot outside
the jurisdiction but also those who have concealed their
whereabouts.
Why did the Second Circuit depart from prior precedent in
order to pronounce that the prosecution has a duty under the
sixth amendment to attempt to apprehend fugitive defendants?
One possibility is that the court concluded that the basis for the
205 Of course, even a clear consensus among the lower courts will not guarantee that
the Supreme Court will adopt a particular principle of law. See, e.g., McNally v. United
States, 483 U.S. 350 (1987) (rejecting the uniform view of federal courts of appeals that
the federal mail fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1341, applies to schemes to defraud the citi-
zenry of honest government). A clear consensus might, however, ensure that a principle
of law at least receives-in the words of Justice Harlan-a "respectful burial." See
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 349 (1963) (Harlan, J., concurring).
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traditional approach had b een eroded by more recent decisions
under the speedy trial clause. However, the likelihood that this
was the conclusion is somewhat diminished by the fact that the
Diacolios panel never acknowledged that it had rejected the
traditional view of the speedy trial clause much less attempted
to justify its rejection of that view. Moreover, a review of the
earlier decisions in light of more recent Supreme Court prece-
dent reveals no compelling reason to reject the traditional view.
A. Flight as a "Waiver"
Courts traditionally have denied fugitive defendants the
benefit of the speedy trial right for two principal reasons. The
first rationale, which regarded the defendant's deliberate ab-
sence from the jurisdiction as a "waiver" of the speedy trial
right, was applicable throughout the federal courts prior to the
Supreme Court's rejection of the "demand-waiver doctrine" in
Barker v. Wingo. °6 Under the prevailing view, a defendant
waived the right to a speedy trial by engaging in any affirmative
course of conduct which demonstrated his acquiescence to pre-
trial delay.207 Some courts, taking an especially expansive view
of waivers, found that a defendant also relinquished the right by
inaction, that is, merely by failing to insist on a prompt trial.'0
As one court explained:
The right of the accused to a discharge for failure of the prosecution
to give him a speedy trial is a personal one to him and may be waived.
He must assert the right if he wishes its protection and if he does not
make a demand for trial or resist a continuance of the case, or if he
goes to trial without objection that the time limit has passed, or fails
to make some kind of effort to secure a speedy trial, he will not ordi-
narily be in a position to demand dismissal because of delay in prose-
cution .... 20
206 407 U.S. 514, 528 (1972).
207 See, e.g., Morland v. United States, 193 F.2d 297, 298 (10th Cir. 1951); Shepherd
v. United States, 163 F.2d 974, 976 (8th Cir. 1947); Pietch v. United States, 110 F.2d 817(10th Cir. 1940); Phillips v. United States, 201 F. 259 (8th Cir. 1912); Daniels v. State, 68
Okla. Crim. 324, 327, 98 P.2d 68, 70 (1940).
2I See, e.g., State v. Kopelow, 126 Me. 384, 386, 138 A. 625, 626 (1927).
209 Shepherd, 163 F.2d at 976. But see, e.g., United States v. Chase, 135 F. Supp.
230, 231 (N.D. I. 1955) (application of the demand-waiver rule should be limited to
cases where the defendant takes "action in avoidance or delay of trial more positive than
mere silence or inaction"); Fulton v. State, 178 Ark, 841, 845, 12 S.W.2d 777, 778 (1929)
(defendants imprisoned on other charges, "who have had no opportunity to demand a
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It naturally followed that the speedy trial right was waived by a
fugitive defendant who not only failed to demand a prompt trial,
but affirmatively fled or hid himself to avoid being brought to
justice.2 1 Indeed, cases involving fugitive defendants rested on a
comparatively narrow construction of implied waivers.2 1
Although the Supreme Court in Barker v. Wingo construed
speedy trial waivers more narrowly than had the lower courts,212
its narrow construction was entirely consistent with the view
that, by fleeing from justice, a defendant relinquished his right
to a speedy trial. Thus, an examination of this traditional ration-
ale in light of the Supreme Court's contemporary decisions dem-
onstrates that it is still valid.
The Barker Court rejected the doctrine that a defendant
waived his speedy trial right simply by failing to demand a
speedy trial. The Court found that because a defendant had no
affirmative responsibility to demand that his trial commence, it
was improper to infer, merely from the defendant's silence, that
he had knowingly and voluntarily relinquished his right to a
speedy trial.21 3 This was not a particularly generous view of the
defendant's right to a speedy trial, however. As the Court ac-
knowledged, its determination was consistent with the contem-
porary view of waivers of constitutional rights.2" Nothing in
Barker suggested that a defendant's speedy trial right only could
be waived expressly.215 It simply established that more is re-
quired to support a finding of implied waiver than mere silence
trial, should not be regarded as having waived this valuable right"); Thornton v. State, 7
Ga. App. 752, 67 S.E. 1055 (1910).
2 0 Shepherd, 163 F.2d at 976. See also Thornton, 7 Ga. App. at 753, 67 S.E.2d at
1056 ("If [the defendant] should absent himself from the court . . . or should do any
other act affirmatively showing an intention not to insist upon his demand [for trial], a
waiver would be implied.").
211 See Chase, 135 F. Supp. at 231.
21 See notes 29-40 and accompanying text supra.
21s 407 U.S. at 526.
224 Id. at 529.
211 Lower court decisions following Barker have uniformly adhered to the view that
the speedy trial right may be waived by a defendant's conduct. See, e.g., Saiz v. District
Court in and for the Tenth Jud. Dist., 189 Colo. 555, 542 P.2d 1293, 1295 (1975) (en
banc) ("The right to a speedy trial may be waived"); State ex rel. Sheppard v. Duval, 287
So. 2d 370, 372 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973) ("the right to a speedy trial is a personal right
that may be waived by the conduct of defendant. . ."); People v. Panarella, 50 A.D.2d
304, 306, 377 N.Y.S.2d 709, 711 (1975) ("There need be no express or explicit waiver of
the right to a speedy trial.").
[Vol. 56: 439
FUGITIVE DEFENDANTS
or passive acquiescence in the face of the loss of a procedural
protection. The defendant must engage in affirmative conduct
which demonstrates an awareness of the right and that it has
been voluntarily relinquished.16
The Barker Court's determination does not require more so-
licitous treatment of fugitive defendants. In assessing whether a
defendant's conduct reflects the voluntary relinquishment of the
right to a speedy trial, there is a big difference between a de-
fendant's mere silence and an affirmative attempt to evade pros-
ecution by concealment or by flight from the jurisdiction. A de-
fendant's mere silence in the face of pretrial delay may be said
to be "insolubly ambiguous."21 7 While it may reflect a defend-
ant's knowing and voluntary decision to forego a speedy trial, it
is just as likely to reflect either (a) an unawareness that he has a
right to a speedy trial and that, by making a demand, a speedy
trial may be secured, or (b) an inability to make the necessary
demand. In contrast, a defendant's flight speaks volumes about
his understanding and desires: an indicted defendant who know-
ingly evades arrest and prosecution must be aware that he is en-
titled to be tried on the indictment, but that as a consequence of
his conduct, the trial will be delayed; indeed, that is the precise
reason for fleeing.
Unlike the demand-waiver doctrine, the traditional notion
that a defendant waived his speedy trial right by fleeing from
justice is entirely consistent with the contemporary view of waiv-
ers.2 " A criminal defendant may waive procedural rights by
deeds no less than by words.1 9 Courts have found that the con-
duct constitutes a waiver of a procedural right especially when
the defendant's acts are calculated to frustrate the invocation of
216 See, e.g., Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 70 (1942).
217 Cf. Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 617 (1976) (Given the nature of Miranda warn-
ings, "every post-arrest silence is insolubly ambiguous .... )
218 On the general issue of waivers of constitutional rights in the criminal context,
see Stuntz, Waiving Rights in Criminal Procedure, 75 VA. L. Rnv. 761 (1989); Tigar, The
Supreme Court 1969 Term, Foreword. Waiver of Constitutional Rights: Disquiet in the
Citadel, 84 HARv. L REV. 1 (1970); Westen, Away From Waiver: A Rationale for the
Forfeiture of Constitutional Rights in Criminal Procedure, 75 MICIL L REv. 1214 (1977).
219 See, e.g., North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373 (1979) (Although "mere
silence is not enough" to establish a waiver of Miranda rights, this "does not mean that
the defendant's silence, coupled with an understanding of his rights and a course of con-




that right. For example, a defendant who prevents a witness
from testifying at trial implicitly waives the right of confronta-
tion. Consequently, the prosecution may introduce the witness's
out-of-court statements which otherwise would be barred by the
confrontation clause.220 Flight from prosecution in particular has
been viewed as conduct by which a defendant may relinquish
procedural protections. For example, a defendant who flees after
trial has frequently been held to waive the right to appeal."'
Settled case law under the confrontation clause provides es-
pecially compelling support for the traditional view of flight as a
waiver. While a defendant's sixth amendment right of confronta-
tion entitles him to be present at trial, a defendant waives that
right and may be tried in absentia if he willfully fails to appear
at trial.222 Thus, in Taylor v. United States,225 the Supreme
Court rejected a defendant's claim that his flight after the start
220 See, e.g., United States v. Mastrangelo, 693 F.2d 269 (2d Cir. 1982); United
States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 630 (5th Cir. 1982); United States v. Papadakis, 572 F.
Supp. 1519, 1526 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (Weinfeld, J.); Republica v. Arnold, 3 Yeates 263 (Pa.
1801).
221 See, e.g., Hurt v. State, 72 Okla. Crim. 318, 115 P.2d 919 (1941); Jones v. Jones,
134 P. 528, 531 (Wash. 1913); Commonwealth v. Andrews, 97 Mass. 543, 544 (1867).
In some jurisdictions, including in federal court, a fugitive defendant's appeal has
not been dismissed on a theory of waiver, but on a theory of nonmutuality or potential
mootness: since the judgment could not be enforced against the defendant in the event
his appeal fails, it is inappropriate to hear it. See, e..g, Molinaro v. United States, 396
U.S. 365 (1970); Allen v. Georgia, 166 U.S. 138 (1897); Smith v. United States, 94 U.S.
97, 97 (1876); United States v. Persico, 853 F.2d 134 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct.
1995 (1988); City of Holton v. Mannix, 6 Kan. App. 105, 106, 49 P. 679, 679-80 (1897);
Thompson v. State, 8 Okl. Crim. 393, 394, 127 P. 872, 873 (1912). For example, in United
States u. Persico, the Second Circuit provided the following justifications for its refusal
to consider claims raised on appeal by a fugitive defendant:
First, a decision respecting a fugitive is effectively unenforceable because the
fugitive is beyond the control of the court. A corollary to this consideration is
that the defendant who flees during the pendency of an appeal has "arrogated
to himself the right not to respond to an unfavorable decision." Second, loss of
appellate review is appropriate because a fugitive flouts the judicial process by
escaping. Third, a rule of dismissal has the salutary effects of discouraging es-
cape and promoting the efficient operation of appellate courts. Fourth, the de-
lay occasioned by the period of a defendant's flight can prejudice the prosecu-
tion should a new trial be ordered after a successful appeal.
853 F.2d at 137 (citations omitted) (quoting United States v. Puzzanghera, 820 F.2d 25,
27 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 900 (1987)).
222 See, e.g., Taylor v. United States, 414 U.S. 17 (1973) (per curiam); Diaz v. United
States, 223 U.S. 442, 455 (1912); Cureton v. United States, 396 F.2d 671 (D.C. Cir. 1968);
Falk v. United States, 15 App. D.C. 446, 454-61 (1899).
22 414 U.S. 17 (1973) (per curiam).
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of trial was not an effective waiver because he had never been
warned by the trial court that he had a right to be present and
that, by voluntarily failing to appear, he would be giving up that
right.224 The Court found it "wholly incredible to suggest" that
the defendant "entertained any doubts about his right to be pre-
sent at the trial" and "equally incredible" that he "'would not
know that as a consequence [of his flight] the trial would con-
tinue in his absence.' ,,225
A fugitive defendant's waiver of the confrontation right is
well recognized in the Second Circuit, which has repeatedly up-
held trials conducted in absentia.226 If the defendant's absence
from trial is deliberate, and not caused simply by his unaware-
ness of the trial date, then he has waived his right to be present,
and the trial may commence in his absence.2 2 Moreover, once it
has demonstrated that the defendant's absence from trial is de-
liberate, not inadvertent, the prosecution is under no obligation
to search for the defendant, and the trial may proceed immedi-
ately in his absence.228
If a defendant's flight is a waiver of the right of confronta-
tion, there is no reason why it should not, under comparable cir-
cumstances, be a waiver of the speedy trial right.220 It does not
take an expansive conception of implied waivers to recognize
that, by his conduct, the fugitive defendant voluntarily relin-
quishes his right to a speedy trial.
=4 Id. at 19-20.
25 Id. at 20 (quoting the court of appeals opinion, 478 F.2d 681, 691 (1st Cir. 1973)).
21 See, e.g., United States v. Fontanez, 878 F.2d 33, 35 (2d Cir. 1989); United States
v. Hernandez, 873 F.2d 516, 518 (2d Cir. 1989); United States v. Sanchez, 790 F.2d 245,
249-50 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 989 (1986); United States v. Pastor, 557 F.2d 930,
933 (2d Cir. 1977); United States v. Tortora, 464 F.2d 1202 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 1063 (1972).
2 See, e.g., United States v. Hernandez, 873 F.2d at 517-18; United States v.
Sanchez, 790 F.2d at 249; United States v. Beltran-Nunez, 716 F.2d 287, 288 (5th Cir.
1983); United States v. Benavides, 596 F.2d 137, 139 (5th Cir. 1959); Smith v. Kelly, 664
F. Supp. 131, 134 (S.D.N.Y. 1987).
228 See, e.g., United States v. Hernandez, 873 F.2d at 516 (one-day adjournment of
trial); United States v. Sanchez, 790 F.2d at 248 (no adjournment); United States v.
Lochan, 674 F.2d 960, 963 (1st Cir. 1982) (several-hour adjournment); United States v.
Peterson, 524 F.2d 167, 183 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 US. 1083 (1976) (no ad-
journment); Phillips v. United States, 334 F.2d 589, 591 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379
U.S. 1002 (1965) (weekend adjournment).
2" Indeed, the Supreme Court drew an analogy between the confrontation and




Moreover, the application of the waiver doctrine to fugitive
defendants has a sound prudential basis. As both the criminal
laws and various procedural laws establish, it is wrongful con-
duct for a defendant to conceal himself, to flee the jurisdiction,
or take similar action designed to forestall the trial. Courts typi-
cally eschew procedural rules that encourage individuals to act
wrongfully by allowing them to profit from their wrongdoing.
For example, in United States v. Bryan, 230 the Supreme Court
noted:
[P]ersons summoned as witnesses by competent authority have
certain minimum duties and obligations which are necessary conces-
sions to the public interest in the orderly operation of legislative and
judicial machinery. A subpoena has never been treated as an invita-
tion to a game of hare and hounds, in which the witness must testify
only if cornered at the end of the chase.2"
In particular, because flight to avoid prosecution is recognized to
be wrongful conduct, the law generally discourages defendants
from becoming fugitives. The law imposes penalties upon those
who flee and eliminates, insofar as possible, the benefits to be
gained from flight. For instance, becoming a fugitive is often de-
fined as a crime. Depending on when one becomes a fugitive, the
defendant's flight also may lead to the tolling of the statute of
limitations or to the dismissal of his appeal. 32
Against this background, it is difficult to fathom the
Diacolios panel's decision to treat an indictment as "an invita-
tion to a game of hare and hounds" in which a fugitive defend-
ant may be tried only if the prosecution has chased him with
sufficient vigor. From the perspective of the administration of
criminal justice, it makes no sense to hold out to fugitive de-
fendants the possibility that, if the prosecution failed to pursue
them diligently enough, the charges against them might be dis-
missed. Such a ruling encourages defendants to become
fugitives.3
230 339 U.S. 323 (1950).
231 Id. at 331. See also United States v. Rylander, 460 U.S. 752, 762 (1983) (quoting
United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950)).
232 See, e.g., United States v. Persico, 853 F.2d 134, 137 (2d Cir.) ("[A] policy of
declining to consider former fugitives' claims [on appeal] will tend to discourage escape
and promote the orderly operation of the judicial processes within which defendants
should press their claims."), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1022 (1988).
23'There are always liabilities to becoming a fugitive, including possible criminal
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B. The Fugitive Defendant's Responsibility for Delay
The second traditional rationale for denying fugitive de-
fendants the protection of the speedy trial clause was that a de-
fendant may not complain of delay for which he has any respon-
sibility and that, by evading arrest, a fugitive defendant
becomes responsible for the delay of trial. Prior to the Supreme
Court's decision in Barker v. Wingo, lower courts generally held
that the sixth amendment right to a speedy trial addressed only
those pretrial delays for which the defendant was not responsi-
ble. As the Seventh Circuit stated four decades ago, if the de-
fendant's "own action delays the trial, he is precluded from in-
voking this right." '234 This rule was often applied in cases in
which the trial was delayed because of defense motions or other
conduct by the defendant in the course of pretrial litigation."5 It
was deemed equally applicable in a case where the defendant's
flight made him unavailable for trial.236 In some cases, courts ex-
liability for evading prosecution, as well as the risk that, if the defendant ultimately
faces prosecution on the pending charges, his flight will be viewed as evidence of "con-
sciousness of guilt." See generally Note, Rule 403 and the Admissibility of Evidence of
Flight in Criminal Trials, 65 VA. L REv. 597 (1979). At the same time, however, becom-
ing a fugitive has various attractions. It is possible, for example, that the fugitive defend-
ant will never be found and tried or that, by the time he is, the prosecution's proof will
have greatly weakened. The Diacolios decision enhances the attraction of flight. If, be-
cause of limits on investigative resources, because of neglect, or for some other reason,
the prosecution fails to pursue the defendant rigorously enough, the fugitive defendant
may win a dismissal of the charges before the case ever goes to trial.
'3' United States ex rel. Hanson v. Ragen, 166 F.2d 608, 610 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
334 U.S. 849 (1948). Accord People v. Meisenhelter, 381 Ill. 378, 385, 45 N.E_2d 678, 682
(1942).
22 See, e.g., United States v. Peterson, 435 F.2d 192, 193-94 (7th Cir. 1970) (delay
attributable to defendant's requests for new counsel and to defense motions); United
States v. Graham, 289 F.2d 352, 354 (7th Cir. 1961) (delay attributable to defense mo-
tions and to "defendant's unsuccessful appeal of pretrial ruling); Meisenhelter, 381 Ill. at
386, 45 N.E.2d at 682-83 (delay attributable to defendants' requests for continuances).
See also In re Rappaport, 558 F.2d 87, 91 (2d Cir. 1977); United States v. Deegan, 279 F.
Supp. 53, 58-59 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
2-2 See, e.g., Shepherd v. United States, 163 F.2d 974, 976 (8th Cir. 1947) ("Delays
which have been caused by the accused himself can not, of courEe, be complained of by
him.... [A]n accused who becomes a fugitive from justice can not demand discharge
for delay when the delay is the result of his own conduct."); Ex Parte Gere, 64 Cal. App.
418, 422, 221 P. 689, 691 (1923) ("It is conceded that the constitutional guarantee of a
speedy trial ... do[es] not operate in favor of a fugitive from justice. It must also ba
true that the law on this subject should not be permitted to work to the advantage of one
whose arrest has been delayed because of his own wrong. In other words, one whose
dissimulation, falsity, and deceit have been a contributory factor in the matter of his
apprehension is in no position to claim" the benefits of the speedy trial right.); Swain v.
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plained that a defendant who sought to avoid apprehension
should not profit from his own wrongdoing,23 but courts did not
have to perceive the defendant to be morally culpable to hold
that he could not complain of pretrial delay. Even if the fugitive
defendant's flight was thought to be morally neutral, this con-
duct on his part was still the primary cause of pretrial delay,
and therefore it precluded him from invoking the speedy trial
right.
This reasoning is partially eroded by the balancing standard
of Barker v. Wingo. Under that standard the defendant's re-
sponsibility for pretrial delay would be a substantial factor
weighing against a speedy trial claim, but not an absolute bar to
such a claim. A defendant who was severely prejudiced by
lengthy pretrial delay might, in theory, be entitled to prevail
even if he was responsible for the delay. On the other hand,
Barker v. Wingo does not in any way address, much less under-
mine, the traditional view that pretrial delay is the responsibil-
ity of a fugitive defendant, not the prosecution.
In holding that the government shares responsibility for
pretrial delay when it fails to pursue diligently a fugitive defend-
ant, the Second Circuit relied on Smith v. Hooey. As discussed
previously, the Supreme Court held in Smith that a state prose-
cutor has a duty to diligently request the presence of an indicted
defendant who is in federal prison and who demands to be tried
immediately in state court. While this holding clearly would not
apply in the case of a fugitive defendant, the court of appeals
apparently read Smith to stand for a broader principle: that the
prosecution has a duty to seek diligently the presence of any
absent defendant, including one who has deliberately absented
himself or concealed himself to avoid prosecution. In other
words, the prosecution must make a diligent effort, regardless of
its cost or likelihood of success, to remove all impediments to a
speedy trial, including those which the defendant established
Swain, 147 Or. 207, 214, 31 P.2d 745, 748 (1934) ("Delays, due to the defendant's fault,
as, for instance, his absence from the state in order to escape trial, afford no basis for
dismissal of the charge."); State v. Reynolds, 28 Wis. 2d at 355, 137 N.W.2d at 16 ("Ap-
pellant cannot complain that he was not tried with sufficient haste when his own conduct
[in fleeing the state] prevented the judicial wheels from turning."). See also Note, The
Lagging Right to a Speedy Trial, 51 VA. L. REV. 1587, 1598-99 (1965), cited in Dickey v.
Florida, 398 U.S. 30, 48 n.13 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring).
213 See, e.g., Ex parte Gere, 64 Cal. App. 418, 422-23, 221 P. 689, 691 (1923).
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and could easily remove.
Nothing in Smith supports such a broad reading. The gen-
eral principle underlying the prosecution's duty to act affirma-
tively in that case seems to be that the prosecution should take
cost-free and almost inevitably successful steps to remove im-
pediments to a speedy trial that the defendant cannot remove.
The Smith Court's emphasis on the defendant's repeated re-
quests to be tried and his inability to obtain a prompt trial on
his own suggested that, had the defendant been able to appear
of his own volition, the prosecution would not have had a duty
to seek his presence. Likewise, by its observations that a request
for the defendant's presence would be little more than a ministe-
rial act and that such a request would almost invariably be
granted, the Smith Court made it clear that the prosecution
would not necessarily be required to undertake efforts which
were costly or unlikely to succeed.
The Smith Court's reasoning clearly would not apply in the
case of a fugitive defendant. Unlike an incarcerated defendant, a
fugitive defendant can obtain a prompt trial on his own and
without much cost simply by surrendering to the authorities.
Further, unlike an incarcerated defendant, a fugitive defendant
cannot easily be brought to trial by the state. On the contrary,
the pursuit of a fugitive defendant, particularly one who is in
hiding, is likely to be expensive and, in many cases, unavailing.
Thus, the Second Circuit's unelucidated conclusion that the
holding or reasoning of Smith v. Hooey applied in cases involv-
ing fugitive defendants was just plain wrong.
VI. THE SUBSEQUENT SECOND CIRCUIT DECISIONS
In late 1988, on the heels of Diacolios, three Second Circuit
cases raised the question whether the prosecution had taken suf-
ficient steps to bring a fugitive defendant to justice. These cases
came before different judges from those who had decided
Diacolios. All three decisions rejected the defendants' claims.
While reaffirming that the sixth amendment required prosecu-
tors to exercise "due diligence" in pursuing fugitive defendants,
the later panels seemed doubtful whether a fugitive defendant
ought to be permitted a remedy for the prosecution's breach of
this duty. The panels' skepticism translated into opinions which
substantially limited the potential reach of Diacolios. The subse-
quent opinions interpreted "due diligence" undemandingly.
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Moreover, these opinions made clear that even when the prose-
cution demonstrably fails to exercise due diligence in pursuing a
fugitive defendant, that failure alone will be far from enough to
warrant dismissing an indictment under the speedy trial clause.
A. The Half-Hearted Reaffirmation of "Due Diligence"
The first two opinions after Diacolios were both written by
Judge Lawrence Pierce for a panel that included fellow Circuit
Judges James L. Oakes and Thomas Meskill. This panel was
duty-bound to follow Diacolios.213 Thus, the panel took as a pre-
mise that the government has "an obligation to exercise due dili-
gence in attempting to locate and apprehend the accused, even if
he is a fugitive who is fleeing from prosecution. '2 3 The court
determined that this obligation applied when the fugitive de-
fendant was in hiding, no less than when the defendant, as in
Diacolios, was living openly outside the jurisdiction.240 The court
23 See, e.g., United States v. Fatico, 603 F.2d 1053, 1058 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. de-
nied, 444 U.S. 1073 (1980) (court of appeals will not overturn prior decision unless issue
is considered en banc).
"'9 Rayborn v. Scully, 858 F.2d 84, 90 (2d Cir. 1988). In support of this obligation,
the panel cited not only Diacolios, but also United States v. Deleon, 710 F.2d 1218, 1221
(7th Cir. 1983), and United States v. Bagga, 782 F.2d 1541, 1543 (11th Cir. 1986). 858
F.2d at 90. These cases were inapposite, since in both cases, the defendant was unaware
of the pending charges, and thus was not deliberately avoiding prosecution. In Deleon,
the defendant was referred to as a "fugitive" but the court made clear that it used the
term to include anyone who was outside the jurisdiction at the time charges were filed.
710 F.2d at 1222 & n.5. In Bagga the defendant only challenged the period of delay
before he learned of the indictment. 782 F.2d at 1542.
In addition, the Rayborn panel noted parenthetically that in Smith v. Hooey, 393
U.S. 374, 383 (1969), the Court "established that [the] government has [an] affirmative
obligation to locate and apprehend a known suspect." 858 F.2d at 90. As noted previ.
ously, this is a vastly overstated reading of the holding in Smith v. Hooey. See text
accompanying note 197 supra. That case did not involve a suspect who was at large and
who therefore had to be "locate[d] and apprehend[ed]." It involved a defendant who was
in prison in another jurisdiction. The case established that the prosecution has a duty to
arrange to bring an imprisoned defendant to court to answer pending charges. It did not
speak to the question of a defendant who was at liberty, and it certainly did not speak to
the question of a defendant who was in flight.
240 Unlike the defendant in Diacolios, the defendant in Rayborn u. Scully had gone
into hiding to avoid prosecution on various state and federal charges. The constitution-
ally imposed obligation to pursue a defendant such as Rayborn is more exacting than the
similar duty imposed by the ABA guidelines, by the old Second Circuit rules, and by the
Speedy Trial Act, none of which would require the prosecution to try to apprehend a
fugitive defendant who had concealed his whereabouts. Under these speedy trial provi-
sions, the period of pretrial delay during which a fugitive defendant's whereabouts are
unknown would be excused even if the prosecution failed to pursue him. See Speedy
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also determined that this obligation arose out of the sixth
amendment and, therefore, applied to both state and federal
prosecutors.241
Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-3174, § 3161(h)(3)(A) & (B) (1982 & Supp. M 1985); Stan-
dards Relating to Speedy Trial § 2.3(e) (1968); 2d Cir. Rules Regarding the Prompt Dis-
position of Criminal Cases, Rule 5. The obligation recognized in Diacolios seems some-
what anomalous, since the speedy trial guidelines and legislation were thought to provide
greater protection to defendants than did the speedy trial clause.
The distinction drawn by the ABA guidelines and federal legislation between hidden
fugitives and those who have surfaced in a foreign country appears to be designed to
take into account that it is considerably more costly to pursue a fugitive whose wherea-
bouts are unknown than to extradite one who is known to be living abroad and that
efforts to apprehend a fugitive who is attempting to conceal his whereabouts are less
likely to succeed. See text accompanying notes 94-98 supra. It might have been argued
in Rayborn that the speedy trial right also embraces this distinction because the cost of
bringing a defendant to trial bears directly on the reasonableness of pretrial delay. See,
e.g., United States v. Banks, 370 F.2d 141, 144 (4th Cir. 1966) ("Incarceration elsewhere,
then, is not an excuse for inaction over a substantial period of months, but it does have
an immediate bearing upon the reasonableness of the interval between the charge and
trial. The greater the difficulty and cost of obtaining temporary custody of the defend-
ant, the longer the interval retains its reasonableness."); cf. Faretta v. California, 422
U.S. 806, 845 (1975) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) ("Society has the right to expect that,
when courts find new rights implied in the Constitution, their potential effect upon the
resources of our criminal justice system will be considered.").
The Rayborn panel never considered whether the duty recognized in Dioolios
should apply only to fugitives whose whereabouts were known. Instead, the court took it
as a given that the duty of "due diligence" applied in all cases of fugitive defendants.
This approach was not without justification, since the pragmatic distinction recognized
by the ABA rules and the Speedy Trial Act may have no constitutional basis. A defend-
ant who remains within the jurisdiction but conceals his whereabouts is no more of a
"fugitive," and no more morally culpable, than one who leaves the country to avoid ar-
rest and then turns up in a foreign jurisdiction. In each case, the defendant is seeking to
avoid apprehension. Cf. Jhirad v. Ferrandina, 536 F.2d 478 (2d Cir.) (there is no mean-
ingful distinction between those who flee their jurisdiction and those who, already
outside, decline to return), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 833 (1976); Matter of Ac.carson, 538 F.
Supp. 1055 (D. Minn.), aff'd, 687 F.2d 1157 (8th Cir. 1982); United States v. Greene, 146
F. 803 (S.D. Ga. 1906), aff'd, 154 F. 401 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 207 US. 596 (1907).
From the perspective of the individual defendants, it is therefore hard to see why they
should be treated differently. Moreover, it might be thought that considerations of cost
are simply irrelevant to whether the prosecution has a duty to bring a defendant to trial
or, if relevant, that financial considerations relate only to the extent of the duty. See
Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. at 380 n.11; United States v. Fox, 3 Mont. 512 (1880); State v.
Sims, 1 Tenn. 253 (1807).
241 See Rayborn, 858 F.2d at 90 ("The determination whether a state has made suffi-
cient efforts to satisfy the 'due diligence' requirement is a fact-specific one. [A] defend-
ants status as a fugitive will not relieve the state of its sixth amendment obligations
The opinion in Diacolios had made no effort to explain why fugitive defendants had
to be pursued. An argument might therefore have been made by the state in Rayborn
that this prosecutorial duty was adopted by the Second Circuit in Diacolios pursuant to
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At the same time, however, Judge Pierce's opinions were far
from receptive to the fugitive defendants' claims. The first opin-
ion, Rayborn v. Scully," 2 contrasted sharply with the district
court and appellate court opinions in Diacolios, which ignored
the fugitive defendant's own complicity in delaying the trial.
The Rayborn decision made clear from the start that the de-
fendant's flight was the principal cause of delay, and that his
speedy trial claim was therefore unsupportable: "Rayborn's evi-
dent lack of serious interest in a speedy prosecution of the
charges against him, as shown by his fugitivity, . . . militate[s]
against finding that he suffered a deprivation of his sixth
amendment right. '2 43
Likewise, Judge Pierce's opinion in United States v.
Blanco244 struck a note that was distinctly at odds with the tone
of Diacolios. The opinion observed that: "Coming from a former
fugitive, Blanco's claim that her right to a speedy trial was de-
nied carries almost no weight."'245 In support of this view, the
court quoted the passage in Chief Judge Feinberg's concurrence
in Salzmann that appears at the outset of this Article, to the
effect that allowing a fugitive to invoke the speedy trial right
"would be sanctioning the playing of games by fugitives. ' 240
It was in the context of this skepticism that the later panels
addressed two questions left uncertain by Diacolios: First, what
is the scope of the prosecutor's duty of "due diligence"? And,
second, what are the consequences of the prosecutor's failure to
pursue a fugitive defendant with due diligence?
B. The Scope of "Due Diligence"
How far must the prosecution go to satisfy its obligation of
its supervisory authority, just as the Second Circuit had previously enacted speedy trial
rules which imposed a similar duty on prosecutors. If so, the duty would not burden
state prosecutors since the Second Circuit does not have supervisory authority over the
state courts. In holding that state prosecutors do have to exercise "due diligence," just
like their federal counterparts, the Rayborn panel made clear that the source of the duty
was not the court's supervisory authority but the speedy trial clause, which is binding on
the states. See note 23 and accompanying text supra.
242 858 F.2d 84 (2d Cir. 1988).
243 Id. at 89.
244 861 F.2d 773 (2d Cir. 1988).
245 Id. at 780.




"due diligence"? Must it do everything in its power to appre-
hend fugitive defendants? If so, the prosecutorial obligation
would be extraordinarily onerous. As illustrated by the invasion
of Panama and subsequent capture of its fugitive defendant,
Gen. Manuel Noriega, in December 1989, there are virtually no
limits to the prosecution's reach when it has a sufficiently com-
pelling desire to apprehend a fugitive.47 Of course, in the ab-
sence of a legal obligation to pursue fugitives, the prosecution
would rarely go the limit. It would adopt different measures
from case to case depending on, among other things, the serious-
ness of the criminal charges, the cost of seeking the defendant," 8
and the likelihood that the defendant's presence would success-
fully be obtained.249 After Diacolios, however, it was far from
certain that, based on considerations such as these, the prosecu-
tion could properly refrain from adopting available measures to
apprehend fugitive defendants, except insofar as those measures
would be "futile. 2
50
' Noriega was indicted on drug-trafficking charges by two federal grand juries in
Florida in February 1988. One of the principal justifications provided by the government
for the invasion of Panama was to bring Noriega to justice. See 25 Weekly Compilation
of Presidential Documents 1974-76 (Dec. 20, 1989).
Although the invasion of a Panama is an extreme example, the federal government
has often gone to considerable expense to capture fugitive defendants. For example, the
history of the nineteenth-century West is replete with stories of the lengths to which
marshals and Texas rangers went to "bring them in alive-or dead." G. Siiu.sLn. Lw
WEST OF FORT SaurH 41 (1968) (quoting Judge Isaac C. Parker of the Western District of
Arkansas). See, e.g., id. at 54-56; W. GARD. Fiomrma Jusica 226.29 (1949); see also T.
DIMSDALE, THE VIGILANTES OF MONTANA. OR POPULAR JusIc. tN Ti- Rocicv MoUNVArns
(1866); G. SHIRLEY, WEST OF HELL'S KITCHEN (1978).
248 The extradition of a fugitive defendant is both complicated and time-consuming.
In general, the prosecutor must not only prepare her own affidavit, which identifies the
crimes charged and sumnarizes the facts of the case, but also submit affidavits from
witnesses in order to establish that a crime was committed by the defendant. The mate-
rial must be reviewed by the Department of Justice and the State Department before it
is submitted to the appropriate United States embassy for formal presentation to the
foreign government. See generally Snow, International Extradition, 22 TRIAL 56-58
(Sept. 1986); United States Department of Justice, Office of International Affairs, Proce-
dure for Requesting International Extradition §§ 9-15.000 - 9-15.170 (Feb. 22, 1988).
249 Defendants may have an opportunity to resist extradition. In the United States,
for example, defendants may challenge the sufficiency of the evidence and defend against
extradition on a variety of other grounds as well. See generally Kester, Some Myths of
United States Extradition Law, 76 GEo. .J. 1441 (1988).
210 Diacolios, 837 F.2d at 83-84.
An expansive approach to "due diligence" was suggested by the doctrinal origins of
the duty announced in Diacolios. The duty to seek fugitive defendants was derived from
the duty to obtain the presence of incarcerated defendants, which in turn was derived by
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The Second Circuit decisions after Diacolios made clear
that the duty imposed by the sixth amendment was considerably
less demanding than prosecutors might originally have feared. In
the first case, Rayborn v. Scully, 251 the defendant was charged
by New York State with murder in 1971, but not tried and con-
victed until seven years later. On appeal, Rayborn's principal ar-
gument was that the district judge had erred in holding him re-
sponsible for the first four-and-a-half years of delay.2 52 During
that period Rayborn had been a fugitive seeking to avoid prose-
cution not only on the New York State murder charges, but also
on a Philadelphia homicide charge on which he had jumped bail,
as well as on a narcotics charge in the Southern District of New
York on which he had failed to appear.
The New York authorities had made virtually no indepen-
dent attempt to apprehend Rayborn but, rather, had relied on
the efforts of Pennsylvania authorities. The opening foray oc-
curred in October 1971 when New York authorities learfied that
Rayborn had been arrested in Philadelphia. New York police of-
ficers were dispatched to Pennsylvania, warrant in hand, but ar-
rived there only to discover that Rayborn had already been re-
leased. The police filed the warrant in Pennsylvania state court,
then went home empty-handed. Nothing more was done until
almost three years later when, upon learning that Rayborn had
been arrested in Philadelphia again, the Manhattan District At-
torney's office obtained an extradition warrant. So much time
the Supreme Court in Smith v. Hooey, from the duty to seek the presence of absent
witnesses before using their prior testimony at a criminal trial. See text accompanying
notes 56-62 supra. In general, courts have required the prosecution to go to considerable
lengths to seek absent witnesses. See, e.g., Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204 (1972); Bar-
ber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968); United States v. Rivera, 859 F.2d 1204, 1206-09 (4th
Cir. 1988); United States v. Rothbart, 653 F.2d 462 (10th Cir. 1981); United States v.
Vasquez-Ramirez, 629 F.2d 1295 (9th Cir. 1980); United States v. Mann, 653 F.2d 361
(1st Cir. 1978);" Government of the Canal Zone v. P. (Pinto), 590 F.2d 1344, 1352 (5th
Cir. 1979); Poe v. Turner, 490 F.2d 329, 331-32 (10th Cir. 1974); Webber v. United
States, 395 F.2d 397, 399 (10th Cir. 1968); United States v. Potamitis, 564 F. Supp. 1484
(S.D.N.Y. 1983) (Weinfeld, J.); Martin, Former Testimony Exception in the Proposed
Federal Rules, 57 IowA L. REV. 547 (1972); Comment, Evidence-Hearsay Excep-
tion-Requirements for Unavailability of Witness in Criminal Case Under the Federal
Rules of Evidence, 29 RUTGERS L. REv. 133 (1975).
251 858 F.2d 84 (2d Cir. 1988).
252 Rayborn had petitioned the district court for a writ of habeas corpus, arguing
that he had been deprived of a speedy trial as required by the sixth amendment. District




had elapsed, however, that by the time the Governor of Pennsyl-
vania ordered Rayborn's extradition he had already been re-
leased on bail by the state court. Finally, in April 1976, Rayborn
was arrested again in Philadelphia. This time, he was required
to answer in turn the charges pending in Pennsylvania, in the
Southern District of New York, and finally in New York State.
The Rayborn panel found that the New York State authori-
ties had done enough to satisfy the demands of the speedy trial
clause. To begin with, the court observed that the state's "law
enforcement officials are not expected to make heroic efforts to
apprehend a defendant who is purposefully avoiding apprehen-
sion or who has fled to parts unknown. ' 213 This implied that less
would be expected from the prosecution in the case of a fugitive
defendant than in the case of an absent defendant who was sim-
ply unaware of the charges-and certainly less than in the case
of an absent witness. In addition, the panel noted that:
[A] state is perfectly entitled to rely in good faith upon the efforts of
another jurisdiction when a suspect for whom an arrest warrant has
been issued evades arrest in the first state and absconds to that other
jurisdiction. Such reliance, if reasonable and grounded in the belief
that the helping jurisdiction is in fact conducting a proper investiga-
tion, must be permitted, because to hold otherwise would be to estab-
lish a rule that states must conduct a "nationwide manhunt" for de-
fendants who flee their jurisdiction.''
Considered in this light, the prosecution's efforts to apprehend
Rayborn, while "not abundant," were nevertheless deemed ade-
quate to establish that the state had "acted with sufficient dili-
gence to satisfy its obligations under the sixth amendment."""'
Similarly, in United States v. Blanco,2 0 the court found
2' Id. at 90.
254 Id. at 91.
255 Id. at 90-91.
Rayborn did not address the problem facing state or local prosecutors when a fugi-
tive defendant absconds to a state where the authorities, perhaps because of conflicting
demands on their investigative resources, are unwilling to make "proper" efforts to find
the defendant. If, for example, the Philadelphia authorities had declined to pursue Ray-
born, would the New York State police have been obliged to go to Philadelphia and look
for Rayborn themselves or would it have been enough that they made a good faith re-
quest for assistance? Rayborn suggests that a request for assistance by another jurisdic-
tion does not discharge the prosecution's responsibility when the other jurisdiction is
known to be indolent but offers no guidance about what more must be done.
225 861 F.2d 773 (2d Cir. 1988).
1990]
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
that "due diligence" was satisfied, notwithstanding the limited
nature of the prosecution's efforts to apprehend the defendant.
Blanco, a Colombian citizen, was living in Colombia at the time
of her indictment in April 1975 on narcotics charges. From then
until her arrest in February 1985, Blanco was aware of the pend-
ing charges, but made no effort to answer them. For most of that
period, federal agents kept track of her whereabouts in Colom-
bia through an informant. In May 1984 she was spotted in Cali-
fornia by a DEA agent but, to avoid jeopardizing another inves-
tigation and to protect an informant, she was not immediately
arrested. Thereafter, Blanco remained in the United States us-
ing a false name and false passports.
Blanco's principal argument was that the government
should have sought her return to the United States by request-
ing her extradition from Colombia, by trying to seize her there,
or by trying to lure her back to this country. The panel dis-
agreed, finding that an extradition request was unnecessary be-
cause such a request would have been futile2 .7 and "due dili-
gence" did not require the government to take futile steps. 218
Similarly, the court found that the government had no duty to
try to seize Blanco. Although the government has occasionally
attempted to kidnap defendants from foreign countries,' it was
not obligated to undertake such an act, which without Colom-
bia's consent or acquiescence would have violated international
law.260 Finally, without addressing whether the government had
a constitutional duty to do so, the court noted that the govern-
ment did in fact try to use an informant to lure Blanco back to
this country.26 '
Blanco further argued that the government breached its
duty by waiting nine months to arrest her after she was spotted
in California. In rejecting this argument, the panel made clear
that the considerations of foreign policy identified in Diacolios
were not the only ones that would justifiably limit the govern-
"' Prior to 1982, this country's treaty with Colombia did not require Colombia to
extradite its own citizens. Although a new treaty in 1982 required Colombia to surrender
drug smugglers to the United States, the President of Colombia announced that he
would not enforce it. Id. at 778.
258 Id.
28 See, e.g., United States v. Yunis, 859 F.2d 953 (D.C. Cir. 1988).




ment's efforts to apprehend a fugitive defendant. Legitimate law
enforcement considerations might also provide a justification.
The court cited an earlier decision in which the unsealing of an
indictment after the statute of limitations expired was found to
be justified because unsealing the indictment earlier would have
interfered with the authorities' efforts to arrest a codefendant.0 2
According to the Blanco court, the need to avoid the possibility
that Blanco's arrest might have jeopardized both an informant's
life and the success of an ongoing investigation "constitute[d] at
least as sufficient a justification for delaying an arrest as avoid-
ing the flight of a co-defendant. ' '2 3
Finally, in Garcia Montalvo v. United States, 2 ' an entirely
different Second Circuit panel issued a per curiam opinion find-
ing that the government had met its obligation of due dili-
gence.265 Garcia was indicted on narcotics charges in 1974 but
not brought to trial until eight years later. During the first seven
years, Garcia was imprisoned or living as a fugitive in Venezuela.
The government filed a warrant for his arrest with the Venezue-
lan authorities but did not request his extradition, since this
country's treaty with Venezuela did not provide for the extradi-
tion of narcotics offenders. In 1981, Garcia went to Brazil, where
he was arrested. The United States government filed a detainer
with the Brazilian authorities, who returned Garcia to this coun-
try the following year. The court of appeals found that since
Garcia was not subject to extradition under the treaty, the gov-
ernment's filing of a warrant with Venezuelan authorities "satis-
fied [its] constitutional duty to make a good-faith effort to re-
turn Garcia from Venezuela. '266
Taken together, these decisions are notable in two principal
respects. First, they establish that the prosecution's failure to
212 Id. (citing United States v. Muse, 633 F.2d 1041, 1044 (2d Cir. 1980)).
263 Id.
The court also rejected Blanco's claim that, like the defendant in United States v.
Salzmann, 548 F.2d 395 (2d Cir. 1976), she was not a fugitive because the government
had been aware of her address in Colombia. The Blanco court pointed out that, unlike
Salzmann, Blanco knew of her indictment but neither communicated with the govern-
ment nor suggested that she would be willing to return to this country to stand trial. 816
F.2d at 780.
26 862 F.2d 425 (2d Cir. 1988).
265 This panel was comprised of Circuit Judges Van Graafeiland, Winter, and
Mahoney.
2,6 862 F.2d at 426.
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take otherwise reasonable steps to apprehend a fugitive defend-
ant may be justified by a variety of countervailing government
interests. In particular, the prosecution's obligation of due dili-
gence may be limited by law enforcement considerations as well
as foreign policy considerations. Second, these decisions estab-
lish that even when there is no reason not to pursue a fugitive
defendant, "due diligence" requires little more than a token ef-
fort to find and apprehend the defendant, except in the unusual
case when the fugitive defendant's whereabouts are known and
the fugitive is subject to immediate capture or extradition by
treaty. The court's narrow construction of "due diligence" in the
more common situation of defendants who are in hiding or in
flight is justified by the difficulties encountered in ferreting out
fugitive defendants. Those defendants who are actively conceal-
ing their whereabouts are invariably harder to find than defend-
ants who are simply unaware of the charges; indeed, in some
cases, defendants in flight might never be located. It seems fair
to require the prosecution to take whatever steps are reasonably
likely to lead to the discovery of individuals who are not actively
avoiding the judicial process. However, in the case of a fugitive,
since there may be no steps that are reasonably likely to lead to
the defendant's apprehension, only some modest effort should
be required.
C. The Significance of a Failure of "Due Diligence"
The most important question addressed by the decisions af-
ter Diacolios was, what is the legal significance of the prosecu-
tion's failure to pursue a fugitive defendant diligently? Perhaps
because it ultimately denied the defendant's speedy trial claim,
the Diacolios panel never commented on Judge Haight's appar-
ent view that a showing of prosecutorial nonfeasance would suf-
fice in itself to establish a speedy trial claim brought by a fugi-
tive defendant. There was, for example, no recognition in the
Diacolios opinion that under the Barker standard, the govern-
ment's responsibility for pretrial delay would be just one of sev-
eral relevant considerations to be weighed in determining
whether the defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial
had been abridged. The legal discussion in Diacolios focused en-
tirely on the issue of due diligence and made no reference what-
soever to the balancing test of Barker.
In Rayborn, however, the court of appeals made clear that
[Vol. 56: 439
FUGITIVE DEFENDANTS
the prosecution's failure to exercise due diligence will not neces-
sarily suffice to establish a speedy trial claim. It employed the
Barker analysis and emphasized that no single Barker factor is
dispositive, but that "courts still must engage in a sensitive bal-
ancing process whereby the conduct of both the prosecution and
the defendant are weighed. '2 7 Accordingly, in all three decisions
after Diacolios, the Second Circuit applied the Barker balancing
test.
268
Moreover, under the Barker analysis, as interpreted in these
decisions, a fugitive defendant's speedy trial claim will almost
invariably fail, even if the prosecution has neglected to pursue
the defendant with "due diligence." This is true for two reasons.
First, even if the prosecution has not met its obligation, the sec-
ond Barker factor-the reason for pretrial delay-will not weigh
in the defendant's favor. It will be neutral. That is because, de-
spite its nonfeasance, the prosecution will not be solely responsi-
ble for the pretrial delay; the defendant will share responsibility
because his flight will have contributed to the delay.09
In addition, the last two Barker factors will almost invaria-
bly weigh against the fugitive defendant. The third fac-
tor-whether the defendant asserted the right to a speedy
trial-will always weigh against a defendant who is avoiding
"8I Rayborn, 858 F.2d at 89 (emphasis in original).
This conclusion was clearly correct, since the Supreme Court's decision in Barker
made clear that no one factor will establish a speedy trial claim. See notes 29-40 and
accompanying text supra. Indeed, even before Barker the law was clear that the prosecu-
tion's responsibility for pretrial delay was not reason enough for dismissing the indict-
ment under the speedy trial clause. In Smith v. Hooey and Dickey v. Florida, both cases
in which the Supreme Court found that the prosecutor had failed to diligently seek the
appearance of imprisoned defendants, that nonfeasance alone did not justify dismissing
their indictments. In Smith, the Court's remand was interpreted to permit the state
court to make an independent determination whether the defendant had been prejudiced
by the pretrial delay and, if he had not been, to deny relief. See Smith v. Hooey, 393
U.S. at 383-84 (separate opinion of Harlan, J.); id. at 384 (White, J., concurring). In
Dickey, the Court found that the defendant had clearly been prejudiced by the lengthy
pretrial delay and implied that, if the harmfulness of the delay had not been apparent,
fact-finding on this issue would have been necessary. 398 U.S. at 38.
28 See Garcia Montelvo, 862 F.2d at 426; Blanco, 861 F.2d at 777; Rayborn, 85S
F.2d at 89.
288 See Blanco, 861 F.2d at 778 ("Blanco must bear the responsibility for the
lengthy delay between her indictment and triaL"); Rayborn, 858 F.2d at 89 (the court
must balance "the conduct of both the prosecution and the defendant"). Cf. United
States v. Sanchez, No. S 84 Cr. 625 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 27, 1989) (LEXIS, Genfed library,
Dist. file) (fugitive defendant has "primary responsibility" for pretrial delay). See also
United States v. Wells, 893 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1990) (Speedy Trial Act).
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prosecution, since a defendant who is in hiding will not be in a
position to seek a speedy trial. Thus, in Blanco, the court noted
that this factor did "not help [Blanco's] case," since she did not
seek a speedy trial during the period prior to her arrest.27 0 The
court's observation was consistent not only with Barker27 1 but
also with post-Barker cases that hold that a defendant's failure
to assert her right to a speedy trial, while not a waiver of that
right, is nevertheless a factor weighing heavily against the de-
fendant's claim.2172
Similarly, the final Barker factor-whether the defendant
was prejudiced by the delay-will generally weigh against the fu-
gitive defendant. A defendant who was in hiding cannot plausi-
bly complain about the anxiety of living under indictment.
Moreover, it will be difficult for a fugitive defendant to demon-
strate that her ability to wage a defense was significantly im-
paired by the passage of time.27 3 Ordinarily, it will be fair to as-
sume that the prosecution's case was impaired as much as, or
more than, the defendant's case. 4 In Blanco, for example, the
court found that the defendant had failed to make a specific
showing that her defense had been impaired. Her unsubstanti-
ated allegation of prejudice was considered insufficient, since the
delay could as easily have helped her defense as hurt it.27 5 More-
over, the court noted: "We are not likely to be easily persuaded
by the complaint of [a defendant] that she was prejudiced by
delay when [she] caused the delay. '276
The result is that the "right to be diligently pursued" is al-
most, if not quite, a right without a remedy. Even if the fugitive
defendant can show that the prosecution failed to seek him with
"due diligence," he will rarely be able to show, in addition, that
the pretrial delay impaired his ability to defend himself to so
great an extent that, under the Barker test, the balance tips in
favor of dismissing his indictment. Given the emasculation of
27 Blanco, 861 F.2d at 778.
27- 407 U.S. 514, at 532 ("We emphasize that failure to assert the right will make it
difficult for a defendant to prove that he was denied a speedy trial.").
272 See, e.g., Morris v. Wyrick, 516 F.2d 1387, 1390-91 (8th Cir. 1975); Matranga v.
United States, 392 F. Supp. 249, 253 (D.S.C. 1975).
2I See Sanchez, No. S 84 Cr. 625 at 7.
217 See id.




Diacolios by subsequent panels, it is scarcely surprising that the
decision has been all but ignored outside the Second Circuit.
VII. THE "DUTY OF DUE DILIGENCE" AS A RULE OF ETHICS
The Second Circuit panel in Diacolios was clearly wrong to
believe that the sixth amendment requires the prosecution to
diligently pursue fugitive defendants. There was no justification
for departing from settled precedent which holds that a fugitive
defendant waives the right to a speedy trial. Indeed, to endow
fugitive defendants with a legally enforceable "right" to be dili-
gently pursued seems almost absurd. It is little wonder that the
Diacolios court stated the applicable legal principle in the lan-
guage of "duty" rather than of "right," notwithstanding that it
was the defendant's right to a speedy trial that was at issue in
the case.2
If it makes no sense to enforce a prosecutorial obligation to
pursue fugitive defendants, there is still a question that remains:
do prosecutors have an ethical responsibility to try to bring fugi-
tive defendants to trial? Courts have not shied away from im-
posing ethical obligations on federal prosecutors in instances in
which the Constitution and federal legislation are silent.2 78 It is
27 Diacolios and its progeny may have escaped attention, in part, because, on quick
reading, the "obligation to exercise due diligence in attempting to locate and apprehend
[a fugitive defendant]," Rayborn v. Scully, 858 F.2d at 90, seems so perfectly consistent
with the prosecution's duty of "due diligence" (1) to seek a defendant who is unaware of
the pending charges, see note 103 and accompanying text supra, (2) to offer transporta-
tion to an indigent defendant who is outside the jurisdiction, see text accompanying
notes 148-54 supra (discussing Salzmann), and (3) to try to obtain the presence of an
incarcerated defendant. See text accompanying notes 51-62 supra (discussing Smith v.
Hooey).
It is important to keep in mind, however, that "duties" imposed on the government
by the Bill of Rights generally reflect correlative "rights" of individuals, and vice versa.
This is particularly true in the context of criminal proceedings: rights and duties are
almost invariably opposite sides of the same coin. For example, the government's duty of
due diligence in the three situations listed above might fairly be recharacterized as (1) a
defendant's right to be apprised of pending charges; (2) an indigent defendant's right to
be transported to criminal proceedings in a distant venue; and (3) an incarcerated de-
fendant's right to be brought to trial. Whether characterized as "duties" or as "rights,"
these aspects of the speedy trial right seem just and reasonable. But the same cannot be
said of the obligation imposed by Diacolios. In essence, the Second Circuit held that a
defendant who flees has a constitutional right to be pursued - indeed, not just to be
pursued, but to be pursued diligently. When restated from the perspective of the indi-
vidual defendant's "right," the Diacolios court's decision seems silly.
17 See, e.g., United States v. Hammad, 846 F.2d 854 (2d Cir.) (prosecutor may not
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worth considering, therefore, whether an obligation to pursue fu-
gitive defendants should be assumed by prosecutors as a matter
of self-governance 27 9 or, indeed, whether the courts should im-
pose such an obligation pursuant to their supervisory authority.
At first glance, one might imagine that the obligation of
"due diligence" recognized in Diacolios has strong ethical under-
pinnings. This is true for a number of reasons, not least of which
is that the duty of "due diligence"-like the related concept of
prosecutorial "good faith"2e°0-surely sounds like an ethical duty.
Moreover, one thing that this duty shares with many ethical du-
ties is that, as interpreted in the cases following Diacolios, the
duty of "due diligence" is largely unenforceable. As well, one
might ordinarily expect that a decision such as Diacolios that is
so lacking in support in the law would, at the very least, be
firmly rooted in a shared societal sense of fairness or moral-
ity-particularly at a time when the trend in the federal courts
is not to recognize new constitutional rights, but to cut back on
the procedural protections afforded to criminal defendants by
the Warren and Burger Courts."
At the same time, however, an obligation to pursue fugitive
defendants would be quite different in character from most ethi-
cal rules. This duty is unlike the affirmative duties imposed on
the prosecution in other situations in order to protect a defend-
ant's right to a speedy trial: the duty to give notice of charges to
an otherwise uninformed defendant, to provide resources to a
defendant who otherwise could not afford to come to trial, or to
perform the essentially ministerial act of obtaining an incarcer-
send informant to contact represented individual who is target of grand jury investiga-
tion), revised, 855 F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1988) (discussed in Green, A Prosecutor's Communi-
cations With Represented Suspects and Defendants: What Are the Limits?, 24 CmRM. L.
BULL. 283 (1988)); United States v. lorizzo, 786 F.2d 52, 59 (2d Cir. 1986) (duty to call
defense lawyer's conflict of interest to the trial judge's attention before trial and to seek
defense counsel's disqualification) (discussed in Green, Her Brother's Keeper: The Pros-
ecutor's Responsibility When Defense Counsel Has a Potential Conflict of Interest, 16
AM. J. CRaM. L. 323, 345-49 (1989)[hereinafter Green, Her Brother's Keeper]).
27 See generally Green, Her Brother's Keeper, supra note 278, at 354 & n.108 (ar-
guing that prosecutors should issue guidelines to govern the filing of disqualification
motions).
2 8 See, e.g., Green, "Package" Plea Bargaining and the Prosecutor's Duty of Good
Faith, 25 CRIM. L. BULL. 507 (1989).
28 See McClurg, Logical Fallacies and the Supreme Court: A Critical Examination




ated defendant from another jurisdiction. This is a duty to allo-
cate investigative resources in a manner which is as likely as not
to prove unavailing, for the benefit of an individual who would
rather that the prosecution not investigate.
It would be unusual to suppose that the prosecution has
some ethical duty to undertake investigations and to go to par-
ticular lengths to discover the whereabouts of all fugitive de-
fendants. As a general rule, the prosecution has unreviewable
discretion to decide how to allocate its investigative resources.
Few would suggest that the prosecution has an obligation to in-
vestigate all crimes, that a criminal investigation must be pur-
sued at any particular length, or that, in seeking to procure evi-
dence of criminal activity, the prosecution has an obligation to
undertake any particular investigative steps." 2 Indeed, few
would even suggest that, after it obtains probable cause to be-
lieve that an individual committed a crime, the prosecution has
an obligation to bring criminal charges. 8 3 The prosecution en-
joys virtually unfettered discretion in deciding how to allocate
investigative and prosecutorial resources.28 It makes sense that
this is so. Government resources in general, and prosecutorial re-
sources in particular, are finite.8 5 Ordinarily, the prosecution is
282 There may be a limited exception when it comes to seeking out exculpatory evi-
dence. For example, it has been said that "a prosecutor may not intentionally avoid the
pursuit of evidence because he or she believes it will damage the prosecution's case or aid
the accused." ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 3-3.11(c). But as a general matter,
there is no generally recognized duty on the part of the prosecution to make an affirma-
tive effort to locate evidence helpful to the accused, much less to look for inculpatory
evidence. See Green, The Ethical Prosecutor and the Adversary System, 24 CRLu L
BuLi. 126, 128-30 (1988).
A minority view was expressed by Judge Miner of the Second Circuit in an arti-
cle which argued that a prosecutor's decision not to prosecute someone who is guilty of a
crime invades the province of the jury and creates a public perception of unfairness. See
Miner, The Consequences of Federalizing Criminal Law, 4 Cmu Jusr. 16, 19 (1989).
2" The prosecution may not make charging decisions for discriminatory or vindic-
tive reasons. See, e.g., Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448 (1962).
285 In a world of finite resources, the ruling in Diacolios could have a substantial
impact, if it were to be taken seriously. The prosecution would be required to redirect
resources from other areas in order to finance the pursuit of fugitive defendants in all
cases. This could mean, if prosecutorial resources remain at a fixed level, that funds must
be taken away from other law enforcement ventures, such as investigations of unsolved
crimes. If, on the other hand, resources for law enforcement are increased to accommo-
date the need to pursue fugitive defendants, funds will have to be taken away from other
government programs. From the point of view of costs and benefits, the undeniable cost
of the Diacolios decision is hard to justify given that the duty of "due diligence" pro-
vides no corresponding benefit to the fugitive defendants themselves. A diligent search,
1990)
BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW
in the best position to decide how to use its resources.
However unusual it may seem, an ethical duty to pursue fu-
gitive defendants might be justified on several grounds. The
first, which can be quickly discounted, is that prosecutors have a
moral obligation to relieve fugitive defendants of the adverse
consequences of their flight. To be sure, this proposition is not
wholly farfetched. On occasion, prosecutors do have a duty to
take steps to protect defendants who make procedural errors.
For example, when a defendant chooses to be represented by an
attorney who has a potential conflict of interest, the prosecutor
has an obligation to alert the court, so that the court can ensure
that the decision is a voluntary and intelligent one.2 6 What
makes the defendant's decision to become a fugitive different,
however, is that it is not just potentially unwise-it is wrongful.
It makes no sense that prosecutors should be empowered to
prosecute defendants for unlawfully fleeing from prosecution
and, at the same time, owe fugitive defendants an obligation to
relieve them of any adverse procedural consequences of their
flight.
A second possible justification for an ethical duty to pursue
fugitive defendants arises out of the public interest in the expe-
ditious resolution of criminal cases. This is, to some extent, a
judicial interest. Bluntly put, judges want to clear their dockets.
That, in part, was what led Judge Weinstein to appoint Profes-
sor Lusky to represent Salzmann and the other fugitive draft
evaders after the Vietnam War. If, in a case like Salzmann, the
defendant is not pursued, the case will remain on the court's
docket forever. 8 7 More importantly, there is a public interest in
finality. In a variety of contexts,288 including cases decided under
the speedy trial clause,289 courts have recognized the importance
of achieving a final resolution of criminal cases. This interest is
obviously undermined when a trial is delayed because of the
if unsuccessful, leaves the fugitive defendant exactly where he is. A successful search
puts him in a position he does not want to be in-a position no better than he would be
in if he came out of hiding on his own.
2" See generally Green, Her Brother's Keeper, supra note 278, at 344-45.
..7 This problem is not particularly compelling. Courts can deal with it by moving
fugitive cases to a separate docket, such as a "fugitive suspense calendar," which can
then be ignored.
" See, e.g., Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1982) (in deciding whether to order
retrial, court should consider public interest in reaching final resolution of criminal case).
28 See, e.g., Barker, 407 U.S. at 519-21.
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prosecution's failure to try to apprehend a fugitive defendant.
The problem is that this is only one among a number of compet-
ing public interests, including the interest in preserving limited
prosecutorial resources. The prosecution has a responsibility to
mediate between those various public interests and to determine
how they can best be served. It is not invariably the case that
the appropriate resolution will entail a diligent effort to locate
and arrest the defendant.
A final possible reason to recognize an ethical duty dili-
gently to pursue fugitive defendants is that, in the absence of
such a duty, the prosecution might decline to seek the defendant
for inappropriate reasons. For example, the prosecution might
seek to gain an evidentiary advantage from the defendant's
flight or from the ensuing pretrial delay.290 Or, the prosecution
might decide not to pursue the defendant so as to turn the de-
fendant's flight into a form of punishment-a de facto, self-im-
posed exile from the jurisdiction."'
11 One possible evidentiary advantage that might accrue to the prosecution from a
defendant's continued flight is that the defendant's flight may be introduced as evidence
of his "consciousness of guilt." This benefit would seem too small, however, to inspire a
prosecutor to let a fugitive defendant remain at liberty. Indeed, the apparent benefit
may be entirely illusory. The value of evidence of flight would not correspond to the
length of the defendant's fugitivity. Even if the defendant is quickly captured, his flight
will support an inference that he believed himself to be guilty of a crime. Therefore, the
interest in acquiring evidence of "consciousness of guilt" would not lead a prosecutor to
give up the chase.
More significantly, in some cases, evidence that would otherwise have been available
to the defense may be lost if the defendant is not quickly captured. It is conceivable that
the prosecution will decline to pursue a fugitive defendant for some period of time in the
hope that exculpatory evidence will disappear in the interval This seems unlikely, how-
ever, since the passage of time is more likely to hurt the prosecution than the defense
which, after all, has no obligation to call witnesses or present evidence, but need only,
and in many cases does only, put the government to its proof. In deciding whether to
pursue a fugitive defendant, a prosecutor would rarely be able to anticipate confidently
that the passage of time will cause more prejudice to the defense than to the prosecution.
2 1 The prosecutor might hope that some kind of "rough justice" would emerge out
of the stalemate in which the defendant is never captured and tried but, at the same
time, is unable to remain openly in the jurisdiction. The defendant is "punished" in such
a case, because he is essentially exiled, albeit by his own choice. At the same time, the
prosecution is spared the expense and risk of trial In a case like Diacolios, this might
seem like an eminently fair result from the prosecutor's perspective, since, had he been
convicted, the defendant probably would have received a light sentence and might well
have been sentenced to probation. Presumably, from the defendant's perspective, this
would also have seemed like a desirable result, since, although giving up the chance to




In most cases, however, when the prosecution decides not to
pursue a fugitive defendant, its decision will reflect nothing
more than a judgment about how best to allocate limited re-
sources, without regard to the impact-positive or negative-of
the defendant's flight upon the defendant. The adoption of a
duty, in all cases, to pursue fugitive defendants seems like an
unnecessarily burdensome and intrusive way of responding to
the possibility that in some small number of cases, the prosecu-
tion will fail to pursue the defendant because of an impermissi-
ble motivation, and not because of a rational consideration of
such factors as the importance of the case,2 e2 the availability of
From a court's point of view, however, this informal resolution of the criminal case
might appear to be unethical. To borrow from Lewis Carroll, this is punishment first and
(if the fugitive defendant is caught) trial afterwards, or (if he is never caught) no trial at
all. It may be argued that this offends the principle that punishment should not be im-
posed in the absence of a criminal conviction. See, e.g., Martin v. Strasburg, 689 F.2d
365, 372 (2d Cir. 1982) (punishment by incarceration must "follow, rather than precede,
adjudications of guilt"), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Schall, Comm'r of New York
City Dep't of Juvenile Justice v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253 (1984).
One possible answer to this argument might be that the principle that defendants
should not be punished in the absence of a conviction applies only to the courts in the
exercise of their sentencing power, and not to the prosecution in achieving an informal
resolution of criminal cases. In our criminal justice system, a prosecutor is accorded vast
discretion to work out an informal resolution of criminal charges, with the consent of the
defendant, rather than to press a case to judgment. For example, a prosecutor can agree
to drop charges in exchange for the defendant's payment of restitution to the victim, in
exchange for the defendant's consent to be deported, or in exchange for the defendant's
satisfaction of other conditions which are, to some degree, punitive. Or, with the defend-
ant's consent, a case can be "adjourned in contemplation of dismissal"; if the defendant
does not commit another crime within a specified period of time, the charges will be
dropped. See, e.g., N.Y. CRIL PRoc. LAW § 170.55 (McKinney 1982). The decision to let a
fugitive defendant remain in self-imposed exile, rather than to try to apprehend or extra-
dite him, is arguably comparable to these other informal means of resolving criminal
charges.
One important difference, however, is that the generally accepted means of resolving
a criminal case without a judicial judgment generally entail a formal agreement between
the prosecution and a counselled defendant that is approved by the court before it dis-
misses the charges. In contrast, when a fugitive defendant is deliberately not pursued,
the "rough justice" that results is not the product of an express agreement. It may not be
understood by the defendant to be a resolution of any kind, and if it is, it often will not
be the product of a counselled decision by the defendant. Moreover, the prosecutor is in
no way bound; even after the defendant has "suffered enough" from the anxiety of the
pending charges and the deprivations attendant to flight, he may be arrested, tried, and
sentenced-thus receiving, in effect, double punishment. Because of the absence of pro-
cedural protections, courts might reasonably refuse to sanction the de facto exile of fugi-
tive defendants.
292 It is most likely that prosecutors will deliberately forego pursuing fugitive de-
fendants in cases in which the defendants are charged with crimes that are not of "high
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investigative resources, and the likelihood that the defendant
can be apprehended. The more appropriate response would be
to give guidance as to the proper and improper factors that may
enter into the prosecution's decision whether, and at what
length, to pursue a fugitive defendant.
In sum, an ethical duty diligently to pursue fugitive defend-
ants seems no more justified than a constitutional right of fugi-
tive defendants to be pursued. For the most part, decisions
about whether and how far to pursue a fugitive defendant
should remain within the discretion of the prosecution.
CONCLUSION
In 1988, a panel of the Second Circuit, almost offhandedly,
issued a novel, and expansive, interpretation of the sixth amend-
ment speedy trial clause. The court's decision in United States
v. Diacolios found that implicit in the sixth amendment was a
new constitutional right of potentially significant consequence to
prosecutors and criminal defendants: the right of fugitive de-
fendants to be pursued diligently. In discovering this right, the
panel was not writing on a blank slate, but, rather, erasing many
years of decisions which held that a fugitive defendant waived
the right to a speedy trial.
Only a few months later, apparently recognizing the
Diacolios decision to be an unsound and unwarranted departure
from the prior law, different panels of the Second Circuit did
unto Diacolios what Diacolios had done unto the prior cases.
While nominally reaffirming the constitutionally imposed "obli-
gation to exercise due diligence in attempting to locate and ap-
prehend" fugitive defendants, the court made it clear that fugi-
tive defendants will rarely, if ever, be provided a remedy for the
prosecution's failure to carry out this obligation. As a conse-
priority" for prosecution. This was true, for example, in Salzmann, where, as both the
district court and circuit court noted disapprovingly, the government had acted discrimi-
natorily by deciding that draft evaders, as a class, would not be extradited. 548 F.2d at
402; 417 F. Supp. at 1157. Similarly, in Diacolfos the panel may have inferred that the
prosecutor had no genuine interest in extraditing the defendant because the crime
charged was not particularly serious and the government's proof was not particularly
strong. The weakness of the evidence against Diacolios was suggested by the fact that on
February 18, 1986, an order of nolle prosequi was filed as to his brother, Vasilios
Diacolios, with whom Michael Diacolios had been jointly charged. Brief for Defendant-
Appellee at 8, United States v. Diacolios, 837 F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 1988).
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quence, the prosecutorial duty recognized in Diacolios will func-
tion, at most, as an ethical obligation, not a legally enforceable
one. Yet, even as an ethical obligation, the duty to pursue vigor-
ously all fugitive defendants is hard to justify. The decision
whether to give chase to particular defendants who have taken
flight, and the decision when to give up the chase, ought to be
made by the prosecution on a case-by-case basis, with regard not
only for the public interest in speedily resolving criminal cases,
but also for the public interest in the sound allocation of limited
investigative and prosecutorial resources.
